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Abstract

Biometric computer authentication has an advantage over password and access card
authentication in that it is based on something you are, which is not easily copied or stolen.
One way of performing biometric computer authentication is to use behavioral tendencies
associated with how a user interacts with the computer. However, behavioral biometric
authentication accuracy rates are much larger then more traditional authentication methods.
This thesis presents a behavioral biometric system that fuses user data from keyboard,
mouse, and Graphical User Interface (GUI) interactions. Combining the modalities results
in a more accurate authentication decision based on a broader view of the user’s computer
activity while requiring less user interaction to train the system than previous work. Testing
over 30 users, shows that fusion techniques significantly improve behavioral biometric
authentication accuracy over single modalities on their own. Two fusion techniques are
presented, feature fusion and decision level fusion. Using an ensemble based classification
method the decision level fusion technique improves the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) by
0.86% and False Rejection Rate (FRR) by 2.98% over the best individual modality.
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COMPUTER BASED BEHAVIORAL BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
VIA MULTI-MODAL FUSION

I.

Introduction

omputer systems have become increasingly integral to the way that information is

C

created and transferred in our society, making the security of these systems more

important than ever. Information security is commonly separated into three categories,
confidentiality, integrity and availability, each of which are equally important when
considering the security of data [3]. The authenticity of a user who is accessing that data
must be validated in order for all three information security principles to hold.
Authentication of a user is the process of confirming that the individual accessing
and interacting with the computer, is who they claim to be. Traditionally authentication is
based on something you know and/or something you have. An example would be using
a Common Access Card (CAC) and pin number or a username and password [34]. One
downside however is that this type of authentication can be lost, stolen, or disclosed. It
also does not truly identify the user as themselves, but instead by something they know or
have. Biometric authentication is advantageous in that it is based on something you are
[9]. There are two subsets of biometric authentication, physiological and behavioral [25].
These authentication methods identify the user as themselves based on measurable physical
or behavioral characteristics.
1.1

Physiological Biometrics
Physiological biometric authentication involves measuring physical characteristics

of a persons body that make them unique. Physiological methods include fingerprint

1

scanning, facial recognition, hand geometry recognition or retinal scans [25]. Generally
these methods are more reliable and successful in real world application than behavioral
techniques [14]. One drawback of physical biometrics is that they require hardware to
perform the biometric data collection. This hardware adds cost and another layer of
complexity to the login process for the user. Another drawback is that all of the physical
biometric methods still contain some error. Comparison testing by Bhattacharyya, et al.
[25], found that the iris scanner, with an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.01% performed the
best.
1.2

Behavioral Biometrics
Behavioral biometric authentication is the process of measuring behavioral tendencies

of a user resulting from both psychological and physiological differences from person to
person. Behavioral methods for authentication include typing dynamics [1, 2, 6, 10, 20, 37],
mouse dynamics [11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 39], voice recognition [25], signature verification [25]
and Graphical User Interface (GUI) usage analysis [7, 9, 15–17, 22]. Due to the variability
of the human body and mind, the adoption of this type of biometrics has lagged behind
physiological biometrics. However, the use of keystrokes, mouse dynamics and GUI
interaction for biometrics does not require extra hardware. The data can be collected using
software that gathers information from the existing keyboard, mouse and GUI messages
sent by the installed operating system. A second benefit to computer interaction based
biometrics is that authentication can occur actively throughout the user’s session as opposed
to once during initial logon. This could prevent a user’s session from being hijacked after
the initial logon has occurred.
1.2.1

Issues with Behavioral Biometrics.

Current implementations of behavioral biometric authentication systems have underlying problems resulting in slow adoption into real world environments. The first is the
amount of user data that is needed to both train and test the system. Previous systems need

2

thousands of user actions which can take hours of interaction before a decision is able to
be made to the claimed accuracy. Keystroke based systems need to be trained on 15,00085,000+ keystrokes and tested on 300-900 keystrokes. Mouse movement based systems
need 10,000-12,500 mouse movements for their training set and 25-2,000 movements for
testing. GUI thresholds have yet to be established by previous work. This amount of data
can take time to collect and might not catch a malicious user who is trying to minimize
their time on the system.
Second, is the number of modalities that previous systems collect data from. Almost
all previous systems collect data from only one modality leaving others susceptible to
malicious use without the biometric system knowing.
Finally the accuracy of the system needs to be improved. High number of false alarms
frustrates users and network administrators but on the other hand a lack of detection of
malicious use cannot be tolerated. Both types of error need improvement from current
levels and should begin to approach physical biometric error rates if behavioral biometrics
are ever to be adopted.
1.3

Multi-Modal Fusion
This thesis presents a behavioral biometric system that fuses user data from keyboard,

mouse, and GUI interactions. The system collects user characteristics relating to the way a
particular user interacts with the computer. This is done by monitoring a users keystrokes,
mouse movements, and GUI usage patterns while they are performing free computer use
over a set of three research based tasks. Features are calculated on these actions. Feature
fusion is then used to combine data from the three modalities for classification.
Classification occurs on the data in both an identification (multi-class) and authentication (binary class) situation leading to the reported results. Identification is the process
of determining who the user is, while authentication is used to confirm the validity of that
identity. Additionally, an Ensemble Based, Decision Level (EBDL) fusion method is an-

3

alyzed which first classifies on each modality alone and generates a fusion of the results.
A final classifier then produces a decision. From the experiments that follow, it was found
that using EBDL fusion, significant classification improvements were achieved over each
of the individual modalities on their own and feature fusion.
By collecting user interactions from all three surfaces, the malicious user cannot
escape the watchful eye of a system that is able to monitor all at once. For example, if
a malicious user knows that keystroke dynamics are being used to monitor a computer
system, they could perform their activities by only touching the mouse. On top of this
GUI usage analysis seeks to emphasize how the user interacts with the system, such as
do they prefer keyboard shortcuts over GUI menus, page up/down versus the scroll bar or
scroll wheel, etc. There are thousands of minute differences between how two different
users interact with a computer system. Analyzing the entire picture of a users interaction is
shown to improve the accuracy and reliability of a behavioral biometric system.
1.4

Thesis Structure
This thesis is laid out in the following structure. Chapter 2 presents prior work

on biometrics, with the focus being on keystrokes, mouse dynamics, and GUI usage
analysis. Previous work that combines multiple biometric techniques are also discussed
along with concerns associated with using biometrics as an authentication method. Chapter
3 discusses the experimental design of the fusion system to include the data collection
method, participant selection and tasks, features generated from the data, and two methods
of fusing data from multiple modalities. Chapter 4 discusses the performance achieved by
the individual modalities and both fusion methods, along with a comparison of the fusion
system against previous work, and an analysis of how demographics may affect the fusion
technique. Chapter 5 includes future work and final thoughts.
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II.

T

Related Work

he idea of using keystroke and mouse dynamics as a supplement to traditional
authentication has been around for several decades [31], but there has been minimal

research done in the area of combining these two techniques into one system. Graphical
User Interface (GUI) usage analysis is a relatively young technique [16] and brings in the
concept of trying to analyze exactly how the user accomplishes a task within the operating
system interface.
The chapter presents the way biometrics are measured, a definition of identification
and authentication, and static versus dynamic authentication. This is followed by previous
work done in the use of keystroke dynamics, mouse dynamics, and GUI usage analysis as
a means for authentication. Previous work that has fused multiple biometric modalities is
also discussed. Finally concerns with the use of biometrics as an authentication method are
explored.
2.1

Metrics for Biometric Authentication
Being able to quantify the effectiveness of the authentication technique is important.

Previously, performance has been measured using the metrics of False Acceptance Rate
(FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the Equal Error Rate (EER). Both FAR and FRR
are reported as a percentage, and signify the percentage of time an impostor is authenticated
(FAR) or the percentage of time a legitimate user is denied access (FRR). The EER is
the value where at the FAR and FRR are equal. This point is determined by creating a
curve for both FAR and FRR based on the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) for the
classification algorithm [25]. An example of some of the ROC’s used are the number of
seconds of interaction [11], the number of mouse events [12], and the number of keystrokes
[20]. A majority of the previous work reports their results in either FAR and FRR or EER

5

but there are a few [2, 22] who use the rate of identification or detection as a metric for
performance. These values are simply recorded as the percentage of time the system can
make a correct decision on the identity or authentication status of the user. It is important
to note that these values can heavily depend on the number of tests performed.
2.2

Identification and Authentication
Previous work has defined two different problems to be solved by biometrics,

identification and authentication. These two problems have been defined several ways
but in this thesis they will be discussed in the following context. Identification is the
process of determining the identity of a user [9]. This means the system will come up
with an answer of who provided the data sample based on its stored database of known
users. Authentication on the other hand, confirms whether or not that identity is valid
[9]. In biometrics, when performing authentication the system will either give a yes or
no answer based on whether the sample provided matches it’s known user. Traditional
authentication systems such as a username and password, perform both of these functions,
with the username acting as a form of identification and the password being used to confirm
this identity.
2.3

Static vs. Dynamic Authentication
With the focus being on authentication, it is necessary to note the two different ways

that authentication can be performed, statically or dynamically. Static authentication is
what most computer users are familiar with. During static authentication user verification
is performed only once, when the user enters their password at logon or into a lock screen.
This subsequently leaves the session open for attack, and there is little way of determining
who has control of the keyboard. Dynamic or active authentication on the other hand, is
ongoing throughout the users session and would ideally prevent an unauthorized user from
taking control of the computer once the static authentication phase has been completed.
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There have been several different methods that use behavioral biometric techniques to
perform dynamic authentication. These include monitoring the users keystroke dynamics
[1, 2, 6, 10, 20, 37], mouse dynamics [11, 12, 14, 19] or GUI interaction style [7, 9, 15–
17, 22] just to name a few of interest.
In order to simulate dynamic authentication in a testing environment, previous
research has elected to divide up a users session using varying techniques. Ahmed, et
al. [13, 14] and Zheng, et al. [12] both divided up a users session based on the number of
actions they wanted per block whereas Marsters, et al. [20] and Garg, et al. [22] divided up
the users session on a set time interval with a minimum number of actions required in that
time interval. Finally Imsand [9, 15–17] and Pusara, et al. [7] cut up the users data into
thirds or quarters respectively using part for classification and leaving one fraction out for
verification testing. This is an important variable to note for each previous work in order to
understand how they were seeking to achieve dynamic authentication.
2.4

Keyboard Dynamics
Gaines, et al. [31], introduced the idea of using behavioral biometrics as a supplement

to traditional authentication. Initially, keystroke timing data was used to supplement
password entry [10, 31, 37], this evolved into being able to analyze long structured text
as a basis for authentication [1, 2], and finally long free text samples [5, 6, 20]. Each work
mentioned used a similar set of features for classification which include intra-key timing, or
the latency between the depress of one key to the next, and key hold duration, or the average
time between when a key is depressed and released. Research has been done using several
statistical classifiers which have attained similar results in terms of classification accuracy
[20]. An overview of the features that each paper calculated and the type of classifier they
used can be seen in Table 2.1. All work discussed below used a standard 104 key keyboard
with their participants typing in English unless otherwise noted.
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Joyce, et al. [10] proposed a method for using keystroke latencies in order to create
a unique digital signature. This signature was created by requiring the user type in their
first and last name as well as their username and password eight separate times during
an enrollment phase. This established a baseline of latencies between when the different
key pairs were pressed. For example, if the username was Jim there would be timing
information between the press of the J and I, and I and M. From this a threshold is
established which is set as two standard deviations outside of the mean calculated from
the enrollment values for each latency. If any of the latency values fall outside of this range
the person is rejected access and they are deemed to be an impostor. Since this work was
solely password based it does not mention dynamic authentication but rather focuses on
enhancing the static authentication portion of a logon. Using this method Joyce, et al. [10],
were able to achieve a FAR of 16.25% and a FRR of 0.25% in their study.
Brown, et al. [37] similarly focused on using short strings to collect typing dynamics,
specifically the users name, but used a neural network for the classifier as opposed to
the statistical method used by Joyce, et al [10]. In the experiment 46 test subjects were
asked to type their name 25 times and then also type the names of the other subjects in
order to provide imposter data. This timing information was used to create a reference
model to train the classifier. Like Joyce, et al. [10] the features calculated for each
entry included the latencies between the individual key presses and any samples that were
deemed as outliers relative to that users data set were thrown out. Two different Artificial
Neural Network (ANN)’s were tested, the Adaptive Linear Element (ADALINE) and a
backpropagation neural network. The best results were achieved using a backpropagation
neural network that was partially connected and trained to produce the lowest possible
FAR. Using this setup and technique Brown, et al. [37], were able to achieve a FAR of
0.0% and a FRR of 12.0%.
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This was followed up by Monrose, et al. [1, 2]. Their work on using keystroke
dynamics as a biometric for authentication showed promising results based on some
modifications of the work done by Joyce et al. [10]. They received structured typing
samples (100-200 words) from 63 different test subjects over a period of 11 months. The
latency between key presses and the duration of each press was recorded for all test subjects
and stored as profiles. Latencies of the most common key pairs and key triads were then
used to calculate features for the classifier. For example some of the features could be
timing information between th, er, in, on, ng, are, ing, etc. Three different types of
classifiers were then tested but the weighted probabilistic classifier showed the best results.
This type of classifier uses probabilities based on the number of times a given feature was
seen and added more weight to digraph features such as th, er, in, etc., that had higher
frequencies in the English language. A reference score is then calculated between each
reference profile and the unknown profile. The profile that generates the largest reference
score is then labeled to be the same user as the unknown profile. Monrose et al. [1, 2], were
able to report an identification success rate of 87.18% over all 63 test subjects.
Gunetti, et al. [6], proposed the first system that used only free text typing samples.
The collection of data by Gunetti, et al. [6], was done through a HyperText Markup
Language (HTML) based web page that used Javascript to capture the timing data. Test
subjects were allowed to enter anything they desired into the web page but were asked to
type anywhere from 700 to 900 characters. It should be noted that all test subjects spoke
Italian and were asked to type their samples in Italian. This research did not focus on
dynamic authentication and therefore calculated the distance measures on each individual
sample of text as a whole. Forty test subjects provided 15 samples each, over the course
of 11 months. Two methods of calculating the distance between two typing samples were
developed by Gunetti, et al. [6] as well as Bergadano, et al. [5], called R measures and A
measures. R measures are calculated by first determining the digraphs two typing samples
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have in common, ranking these in descending order for each user based on latency time and
then determining the normalized disorder of one of the samples when considering the other
sample as ordered. A threshold was then used to determine at what disorder value two
samples should be considered different. A measures are calculated by taking the latency
times of digraphs that two samples have in common, the larger of the two latency times
are divided by the smaller latency time. If this ratio is larger than a threshold that is set
than the two samples are dissimilar for that digraph. These distance measures were used in
different combinations between digraphs, trigraphs and four-graphs as a classifier. Using
the R measure on digraphs, trigraphs and four-graphs as well as the A measure on digraphs
Gunetti, et al. [6], were able to achieve a FAR of 0.005% and a FRR of 5.0%.
Finally, Marsters [20], developed a system called BAKER (Biometric Analysis of
Keystroke Entry Rhythms) which used a Bayesian network classifier to provide active
authentication using keystroke dynamics. Data was collected from 10 test subjects who
installed the software on their machine and left it running for as long as 18 months.
Marsters initial plan was to calculate both duration of the key hold and the latency between
key presses but unlike previous research the surrounding context was also taken into
account. For example to determine the duration of a key hold the letter pressed before
and the letter pressed after were also recorded such that the hold time for “key Y was
n milliseconds when preceded by key X and succeeded by key Z” [20]. This results
in a trigraph of data. A quadgraph is collected for the latency between key presses but
takes on the form “the latency between the press of key X and key Y was n milliseconds
when preceded by key W and succeeded by key Z”. Due to a limitation of their hardware
however, Marsters had to eliminate the contextual information and proceed with unigraphs
for duration and digraphs for latency information. The mean value recorded was stored
for each type of feature. Several different classifiers were tested but the best results,
both in terms of speed and classification ability, were seen from a BayesNet classifier
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which is integrated into the Weka data mining toolkit. For their system to perform active
authentication a three hour time slice was set with a requirement that each three hour block
contain at least 300 keystrokes. Three hours is one of the longest time slices seen in
previous work and was presumably picked to allow for the collection of ample data to
calculate meaningful unigraphs and digraphs but this is not explicitly stated. From this
research an EER of 0.27% was reported.
Even though there has been a fair amount of research into keystroke dynamics it has
been suggested that there remains much to be desired in terms of implementation and
deployment on a commercial level [20]. Several companies have released software that
was designed to not only verify the users password but also the way the password was
typed. This includes Deepnet Security’s TypeSense, and bioChec which contains a patented
signature matching algorithm [9].

Table 2.1: Keystroke features from previous work.
Article

Features Calculated

Classifier

Latencies between key presses of:

Custom built

- Username, password and full name

Statistical classifier

Latencies between key presses of:

Neural Network

Joyce, et al. [10]

Brown, et al. [37]
- Full name

Monrose, et al. [2]

Duration and latency between:

Weighted

- 100 to 200 words of free or

probabilistic

structured text

classifier

Duration and latency between:

R and A distance

- 700 to 900 characters of free text

measures

Duration and latency between:

BayesNet

Gunetti, et al. [6]

Marsters [20]

> 300 characters of free text
11

2.5

Mouse Dynamics
Biometrics based on mouse dynamics involves monitoring the way a user moves the

mouse in order to use that data as a means for authentication [11, 12, 14, 19]. Initially
Gamboa, et al. [11], used a memory game to capture mouse movements, where as work
that came after ([12, 14, 19]) focused on free mouse movements in day-to-day use. The
features calculated on this type of data include average speed per movement direction, click
based interval times, action histogram, and average movement speed per travel distance.
Classification was performed using both an ANN [14] and Support Vector Machine (SVM)
[12, 19].
Gamboa, et al.

[11], proposed a behavioral biometric system based on human

interaction with the pointing device. They constructed a web page and corresponding script
that collected a user’s mouse coordinates as they were playing a memory game. Due to this
they were not able to make a guarantee on the type of mouse their participants were using
whether it be three button mouse, track pad, etc. Gamboa, et al. collected about 10 hours
of interaction from 50 users, which corresponded to about 400 individual mouse strokes
per user. They defined a stroke as the movement between two points in their memory
game. They then calculated 63 features for each stroke from this data, which can be seen
in Table 2.2. This was done for 50 strokes with the average of all the values taken to
make one block of features. The most discriminating features were selected using a greedy
Sequential Feature Selection (SFS) method and then fed into a sequential classifier. To train
the classifier they calculated features over the first half of the data collected and the second
half was used for testing the performance of the system. By using this method, Gamboa, et
al. [11] were able to achieve an EER of 2% using ninety seconds of interaction.
Ahmed, et al. [14], used real operating conditions and monitored a user’s mouse
activity during their daily activity.

The data collection was performed by installing

interception software on each of the user’s workstations, which recorded mouse activity
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every quarter of a second and periodically sent the data back to a detection server placed
on their network. Due to the fact that participants used their own workstations, the type of
mouse, pointer speed and screen resolution could not be controlled, however they do not
think this affected their results. The interception software was installed on the machines
of 22 participants leading to 998 sessions being recorded with an average of almost 13
hours of input per user. From this data Ahmed, et al. [14], generated 39 different features
for each user, to include things like movement speed compared to direction, an action
type histogram, movement type histogram and many more. The full list is displayed in
Table 2.2. These features were then fed into an ANN which was used as the classifier. The
neural network was configured to automatically place a higher weight to features that it
deemed the most reliable or discriminating based on the input data. The neural network
used was a feed-forward multilayer perception network consisting of three layers, and 39
nodes, trained using the Levenberg-Marquardt back propagation algorithm. In order to
facilitate dynamic authentication in their experiment, the user’s data was sliced into blocks
of 2,000 actions. From their research, Ahmed, et al. [14], were able to achieve a FAR of
2.4649% and a FRR of 2.4614%.
Shen, et al. [19], also used mouse based biometrics with an SVM to try and further
improve on the results seen by Ahmed et al. [14]. Shen, et al.[19], similarly asked
participants to install a data collector on their workstation which would record their mouse
activity during a normal day of computer use. Once again this implies that the exact type
of mouse used by the participants was not controlled however it was presumed to remain
constant over the testing period. They were able to collect data from 20 users over a period
of two months recording at a frequency of 100 hertz. From this Shen et al. [19], calculated
45 features similar to those mentioned above and are displayed Table 2.2. They then used
SFS and Plus-M-Minus-R (PMMR) to determine the most discriminating set of features for
the data being used. The hypo-optimum features were tested on both an ANN and SVM.
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Table 2.2: Mouse modality features from previous work.
Article

Features Calculated

Classifier

Min, max, std dev, and min-max of each per stroke:

Gamboa, et al. [11]

Ahmed, et al. [14]

Shen, et al. [19]

- Horizontal and vertical coordinate vector
- Angle of the path tangent with the x axis
- Curvature
- Horizontal, vertical, tangential and angular velocity
- Tangential acceleration and jerk
- Time and length of the stoke
- Straightness, jitter, paused time and paused time ratio
- High curvature critical points, and time to click
- Movement speed compared to travel direction
- Average movement speed per direction
- Movement direction histogram
- Average movement speed per action type
- Travel distance histogram
- Movement elapsed time histogram
- Mouse action histogram
- Mouse silence ratio
- Distribution of actions on the screen
- Distribution of movement distances
- Distribution of movement directions
- Single-click interval times
- Double-click interval times
- Average movement speed compared to travel distance
- Extreme movement speed compared to travel distance

Sequential
classifier

ANN

SVM

Angle metrics calculated between the endpoints of movements:

Zheng, et al. [12]

- Direction: angle between the horizontal and line of travel
- Angle of curvature (AOC): angle formed by three consecutive
points A,B,C the AOC is angle ABC
- Curvature distance: ratio of the distance from point A to C
and perpendicular distance from B to the line AC
- Movement speed
- Pause and click time

SVM

Features were calculated on 30 evenly sized blocks for the known user and 45 total samples
from nine different malicious users. By doing this Shen, et al. [19], were able to report a
FAR of 1.86% and a FRR of 3.46% when using a SVM with the PMMR method of feature
selection. Shen, et al. [18, 35, 39] also published three other articles on mouse dynamics
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which were not included in this thesis due to a lack of improvement on the results published
in the work mentioned in this paragraph [19].
Zheng, et al. [12] derived a different approach that involved using a point by point
calculation of angles from the endpoints of consecutive mouse movements. Two tests were
performed, one that was controlled and a second that used a web interface and forum to
capture the user’s mouse movements meaning screen resolution, and mouse type could not
be monitored. The controlled data set contained individuals who were asked to perform
routine tasks on their workstation whereas the field group contained mouse movements
from over 1,000 unique users on a forum page. From this data Zheng generated features on
blocks of 25 point and click actions for a given user. The statistical features were calculated
between each set of individual points and are listed in Table 2.2. To perform classification
a SVM was used from the LibSVM 3.0 package with the Radial Basis Function (RBF) as
the kernel function. Zheng, et al. were focused on dynamic authentication and made the
point that their methods needed less user input data than any previous methods. They were
able to achieve an EER of 1.3% when using a block size that contained 25 point and click
actions however, it should be noted that to achieve these results 500 training blocks of 25
point and click actions were still needed per user.
2.6

Graphical User Interface Interaction
The core concept behind using a user’s GUI interaction style for biometrics has its

roots in a method called command line profiling. Command line profiling [40], monitors
the commands a user sent a command line based system, such as UNIX, in order to create
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The idea behind the concept was that different people
use different sets of commands to perform the same core task. This work was followed up
by Maxion, et al. [38], and Coull, et al. [8], who achieved promising results but were
not accurate enough to create a deployable system. GUI interaction based biometrics
can be thought of in the same manner as command line profiling. When a user wants
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to accomplish a task on the system, there are often many different modalities that can
be used. This includes entirely different programs that perform the same end task, using
keyboard shortcuts versus GUI buttons, etc. When thinking of interacting with the GUI
by sending commands one can draw parallels between command line profiling and GUI
interaction in terms of their use as a biometric technique. Previous work has shown that
analyzing the modalities of a user’s interaction result in a promising biometric technique
[7, 9, 15–17, 22].
Pusara, et al. [7], did an initial look into using GUI based interaction. Their goal was to
derive a method that could be used for continuous authentication or user re-authentication
as Pusara called it. Mouse data was collected from 18 users while interacting with Internet
Explorer. A total of 10,000 unique cursor locations were sampled which took about two
hours per subject. The data collected included mouse wheel movements, single or double
clicks and mouse movements outside of the Internet Explorer window. Similar features
were calculated as in the work of Gamboa, et al. [11], but there was more of a focus on
the number of times a specific action had occurred as opposed to how an individual action
occurred. The full list of features calculated by Pusara, et al. [7], can be seen in Table 2.3.
A C5.0 decision tree was used for classification without boosting through the data mining
tool See5. User re-authentication was simulated by dividing up the user’s session into
quarters. The first two were used for training the classifier, the third for parameter selection
and the last for testing. From their research Pusara, et al. [7], were able to achieve a FAR
of 0.43% and a FRR of 1.75%.
Garg, et al. [22], expanded on the work of Pusara, et al. [7], but focused more on
preventing masquerade attacks as opposed to user re-authentication. A masquerade attack
is defined by Garg, et al. as an attack that occurs when a person exploits a user’s credentials
to access a system when they are not entitled to do so. Both user re-authentication [7],
and masquerade attack have the same fundamental meaning however. Garg, et al. [22]
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collected data from three users who varied from 9 to 50 collection sessions. The collection
software that was used extracted information such as keyboard activity, mouse movements
and events, as well as operating system related information such as when a process was
created or terminated. From this information the features calculated were very mouse
centric and can be seen in Table 2.3. There is however, no explanation as to why keyboard
and operating system based features were not derived from the collected data. Garg used a
SVM from the SVMLight software package as the classifier with the RBF kernel function. To
simulate the masquerade attack detection, a 10 minute sliding window was used throughout
the session such that features for the user would be calculated every minute of use. With
this method Garg, et al. [22] were able to achieve a 96.15% detection rate.
Before discussing the work done by Imsand, et al. it is important to explain the concept
of GUI messages. In the Windows operating system, the kernel produces messages that are
sent to applications informing them of user actions that may need responding to. These
messages contain information on how the user is interacting with the system, and they
can be intercepted and analyzed using hooks [29]. Capturing these messages provides an
additional biometric measure that attempts to expand the complete user interaction picture
over simply mouse and keyboard dynamics. For example if the user is scrolling a web page
it is possible to differentiate between the use of the mouse wheel, paging with the keyboard,
clicking the GUI down arrow, or using a click and drag method by monitoring the operating
system messages.
The most thorough GUI usage analysis has been done by Imsand, et al. [9, 15–
17]. Their work focuses on differentiating between what the users are doing and how
they are doing it by monitoring GUI messages. To do this each of the participants used
in his research were given a list of tasks to perform. These included word processing,
web browsing, searching, and file/folder manipulation within the Windows XP operating
system. By doing this it allowed Imsand, et al. to take the actions of the user out of
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Table 2.3: Previous work GUI usage features.
Article

Pusara, et al. [7]

Garg, et al. [22]

Imsand, et, al. [9]

Features Calculated

Classifier

The mean, std dev, third moment of distance, angle and speed
between a pair of endpoints
The mean, std dev, and third moment for X and Y coordinates
A count of the number of times each is recorded:
- Mouse wheel, clicks outside of the testing area
- Single and double clicks for left and right buttons

C5.0
Decision tree

- Average number of right and left mouse clicks
- Average distance traveled between mouse events
- Average movement speed
- Movement direction
A count of each type of the following:
- User actions (clicks, key presses, etc.)
- Control types (Buttons, scroll bars, etc.)
- Processes/applications that generate messages

SVM

Jaccard index
and ANN

the equation and purely focus on their GUI interaction style. A total of 31 participants
completed the list of tasks five times with 30 minute breaks in between each session. The
data was collected by hooking kernel messages inside of Windows as mentioned above.
By capturing these messages Imsand, et al. were able to generate a set of features which
profiled the user’s actions. This included counts regarding the number of times certain user
actions, control types and processes were observed, as seen in Table 2.3. Three of the five
data sets were used for experimentation. The first two datasets were considered a block
and features were calculated over each of those datasets. The final set was then used for
testing. This style of data set slicing did not line up with some of the other works that
focused on dynamic authentication but it is believed this was done to preserve the integrity
of the task based testing method. Imsand, et al. used a pre-built ANN that is part of the
Matlab numerical analysis suite but was only able to achieve a successful identification rate
of 38.7%. It is also important to note that Imsand et al. [9, 15–17] were able to achieve their
best results using a Jaccard index which is designed to determine the differences between
two data sets. Using this comparison method a 77.1% identification rate was achieved.
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Imsand also performed authentication experiments in which a FAR of 8.66% and FRR of
0.0% was produced using term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) analysis.
Imsand, et al. [9, 15–17] noted that the ANN did not perform as desired due to overfitting.
2.7

Multi-Modal Biometric Techniques
Several instances of research have fused multiple forms of biometric based authentica-

tion methods in order to improve the accuracy of the overall system. Asha, et al. [4] combined fingerprint biometrics with mouse dynamics in order to identify the users enrolled
in an e-learning class. Rabuzin, et al. [27] also make the case that combining multiple
biometric techniques would be beneficial in creating a more robust authentication method
for e-learning platforms. Other fusion combinations include voice and facial recognition;
fingerprint, voice, and iris; and iris and retinal features [33].
2.7.1

Fusion Methods.

Fusion of biometric modalities can occur in different ways. This has been explored in
the physical realm of biometrics but has yet to be heavily tested for behavioral biometrics.
According to Ross, et al. [36], in biometric systems fusion can occur by fusing features
together, fusing matching scores together, or a fusion of the decisions made by each
individual modality. Fusion of features is the simple concatenation of feature vectors from
multiple modalities to be input into the classifier [36]. Matching score fusion is specific to
physical biometrics so it will not be discussed in this thesis and decision level fusion uses
the results from each individual modalities classifier in order to make a final decision [36].
2.7.2

Fusion of Behavioral Biometrics.

Ahmed, et al. [13] integrated keyboard and mouse dynamics into a single architecture
that could act as an intrusion detection system. Twenty two subjects were asked to install a
monitoring system on their workstations that collected keystrokes and mouse information.
They ran the software for nine weeks. In regards to keystroke dynamics Ahmed calculated
both latencies and durations for digraphs and trigraphs [2] and used a neural network for
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classification. For the mouse movements they calculated a subset of features from [14],
which appear in Table 2.2 and used a separate ANN for classification. The results from
these two classifiers were then presumably combined together via decision level fusion
however the exact fusion technique is not discussed by Ahmed, et al [13]. Doing this for all
22 users Ahmed, et al. [13] were able to achieve a FAR of 0.651% and a FRR of 1.312%.
Moskovitch, et al. [30] generated a framework for using behavioral biometrics in
computing for the purpose of protecting identity theft. They focused on both keyboard
and mouse dynamics but did not perform an experiment to back up their hypothesis.
Jagadeesan, et al. [26] researched the concept of user re-authentication that was first defined
by Pusara, et al. [7]. They studied a users mouse-to-keyboard interaction ratio to facilitate
user identification. The ratio compared the number of mouse events to the number of
keyboard events observed by their monitoring software. They used an analysis engine that
consisted of statistical analysis, a feed forward neural network with back propagation, and
k-nearest neighbor algorithm to achieve a user identification accuracy of 82.2% across all
applications tested. They noted it is important to differentiate between the applications
tested since the mouse to keyboard ratio is certainly tied to the application being used.
2.8

Concerns Regarding Biometric Authentication
Many of the discussed techniques demonstrate controlled experimental potential but

have been untested in the real world due to concerns resulting from biometric based
authentication to include: potential vulnerabilities, scalability of the technique, variability
of the user, and the privacy of the user’s actions.
Potential vulnerabilities exist in many different authentication systems whether it be
bugs in the code or a flaw in the overall system architecture. For a biometric system
the amount of time it takes to notice that a malicious user has begun interacting with the
computer is vital. A skilled hacker with the right tools at their disposal can achieve their
malicious intent extremely quick, on the order of minutes. For a system that authenticates
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every few hours, or even every 30 minutes, a malicious user could be in and out of the
network before the biometric system alerts anyone. Current research has not put a large
emphasis on collecting data from an increasing number of modalities in order to collect
more user data in a shorter amount of time, thus trying to reduce the amount of time needed
to both train and test the biometric system.
Scaling the biometric technique into a real world environment has also been largely
ignored. Much of the previous research discussed requires a very large amount of training
data (months of interaction, or tens of thousands of user actions) for the system to achieve
an acceptable level of accuracy. In a real world environment this is not practical. If
a system is installed, the consumer would not be pleased with a month long lead time
required to achieve a reference signature for each user. The amount of participants used for
experimentation has not helped the scalability argument. Many of the previous works use
around 20 individuals where as a system deployed to a real world network could need to
monitor hundreds.
Variability of the user from day to day, and also over a long period of time, must be
taken into account for a biometric system to be considered robust. This is a legitimate
concern and other then mentioning the problem there has been a lack of research into how
to combat it. If a user breaks their arm, or injures their hand in someway, their typing and
mouse dynamics will not be the same [23]. The variability of a user’s biometrics over a
month or multiple years has also yet to be determined. Marsters [20] had three users in his
study record typing dynamics for 18 months and reported that there was little change seen
over this period of time however, this remains to be tested on a large scale or for any other
modalities.
When recording a users activity the issue of privacy is necessary to discuss. The most
common concern is a user’s passwords recorded from their keystroke dynamics. To side
step this Marsters [20] recording software did not store the chronological keystrokes. It
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only kept the timing information for all keys and digraphs pressed so that no individual
words the user typed could be discovered even if the stored data fell into the wrong hands.
In this thesis these privacy issues are noted but are not of concern as test subjects will not
be entering sensitive information in the testing environment.
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III.

T

Experimental Design

his study fuses data from three modalities, the keyboard, mouse and Graphical User
Interface (GUI) to determine if the fused features generated from the keyboard,

mouse and GUI increase the performance of a system designed for dynamic authentication.
The following chapter presents the data collection method, collection environment and
participant tasks, followed by the features generated from the keyboard, mouse and GUI,
and finally the fusion system design.
3.1

Data Collection Software
In order to properly identify an individual via a biometric system, data about that user

must be collected. The target operating system for data collection in this experiment is
Windows 7 particularly because it is used for the Air Force standard desktop and makes
up over 45% of the worldwide market share as of January 2013. In the case of this
system, there are several different types of actions which dictate how the collection software
discussed below is developed. The first is user actions, such as mouse moves, mouse button
actions, or keys pressed. The name of the executing process/application and the system time
of when the action occurred is required and also the type of GUI control method that was
used during the user’s interaction. Two different data collection methods were assessed,
virtual machine introspection and a Windows driver.
3.1.1

Virtual Machine Introspection.

Virtual machine introspection involves collecting information from the target virtual
machine by installing monitoring software on the host machine. Introspection provides
several advantages, with the most important being the users working from inside of the
guest machines have no knowledge of the monitoring software and no way of tampering
with it. As depicted in Figure 3.1, with the monitoring software running in the Control
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Domain (Dom0), all keystrokes and mouse events that occur in the Guest Domains could
be recorded. Keystrokes are monitored by modifying an open source keylogger for linux
called logkeys. This produces output that contains the key, whether it is a press event or
release event and the associated system time. To record mouse events a linux program
called XMacro was used and modified. XMacro recorded all mouse events as well as
coordinates of the pointer every 50 ms. Finally, a customized program that determined if
the virtual machine window was in focus was developed. This ensured that data collection
only occurs when the user is inside one of the guest domains. All of the data is stored in a
text file.

Figure 3.1: The architecture of the Xen hypervisor.

It was determined however, that introspection could not be used to collect the final
type of information, GUI control types. This is due to the fact that collecting messages
sent internal to the Windows operating system could not be performed fast enough with the
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current introspection technology. These messages, which contain the type of GUI control
method the user employed, in the form of a window class name, could not be captured via
introspection.
3.1.2

Windows Driver.

In order to capture all of the necessary messages a Windows driver is developed. The
driver works by inserting itself into the Windows hook chain. The Windows operating
system maintains a hook chain for each different type of hook that can be installed. When
a message is generated that is associated with one of the given hook chains it is passed
down the chain so that all applications receive the message appropriately [29]. The hook
Application Programming Interface (API) provides the capability to install a hook and
monitor system messages for a single application or all applications. In order to install the
hook, a call to SetWindowsHookEx function is made which places the hook at the top of the
specified hook chain. The driver utilizes the WH GETMESSAGE hook which allows the
capture of messages relating to mouse and keyboard input as well as any other messages
posted to the message queue [29].
The intercepted messages lack certain necessary information such as the executing
process or application for which the message was generated. In order to get the process
name the GetWindowThreadProcessId and OpenProcess functions are used which are
provided by the Windows API. The OpenProcess function is used to open the process
object for reading so that the process name can be extracted.
In order to capture the GUI control types Imsand, et al. [9, 15–17] developed a method
that involves monitoring the window class names a user interacts with. In the Windows
operating system a window class is used to “define the default behavior of windows
belonging to that class” [28]. The Windows API presents a function called GetClassName
which returns the class name of a given window. Due to this, these classes, and thus the
class names are more general and can also change between applications, releases, or even
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between service pack versions of Windows. For example Imsand, et al. [9, 15–17] who
used Windows XP, mentioned class names (text box, scroll bar, etc.) that were much more
readable than most of the class names discovered in this experiment using Windows 7, as
seen in Appendix A. Each application has the ability to register its own window classes
with the operating system which can result in a broad range of class names being collected
by the software, based on which applications are in use by a given user. A consequence of
window class names being general is they do not provide fine grained information such as
the name of the control used, therefore, controls like buttons are all counted the same. The
full list of class names discovered during testing can be seen in Appendix A.

Table 3.1: Output from the collection tool when recording keystrokes.
Process

Description

Time (ms)

Event

WINWORD.EXE Microsoft Word Document
1842991521 Keydown m
WINWORD.EXE Microsoft Word Document
1842991599 Keyup m
WINWORD.EXE Microsoft Word Document
1842991630 Keydown o
WINWORD.EXE Microsoft Word Document
1842991677 Keyup o
WINWORD.EXE
Microsoft
Word Document
1842991521
m
WINWORD.EXE
Microsoft
Word Document
1842991677
Keydown Keydown
s
WINWORD.EXE
Microsoft
Word Document
1842991771
Keydown Keyup
t
WINWORD.EXE
Microsoft
Word Document
1842991599
m
WINWORD.EXE
Microsoft
Word
Document
1842991786
Keyup
s
WINWORD.EXE Microsoft Word Document 1842991630 Keydown o
WINWORD.EXE
Microsoft
Word Document
1842991833
Keyup t Keyup o
WINWORD.EXE
Microsoft
Word Document
1842991677

WINWORD.EXE
WINWORD.EXE
WINWORD.EXE
WINWORD.EXE

Microsoft
Microsoft
Microsoft
Microsoft

Word Document 1842991677
Word Document 1842991771
Word Document 1842991786
Word Document 1842991833

Table 3.2: Output from the collection tool when recording mouse events.

Process

Time (ms)

X

Y

Event

chrome.exe
chrome.exe
chrome.exe
chrome.exe
chrome.exe
chrome.exe
chrome.exe

1843274320
1843274382
1843274382
1843274398
1843274413
1843274538
1843274632

1412
1412
1411
1409
1408
1408
1408

1179
1179
1179
1179
1180
1180
1180

MouseMove
MouseMove
MouseMove
MouseMove
MouseMove
LButtonDn
LButtonUp
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Keydown s
Keydown t
Keyup s
Keyup t

The software is run by the testing moderator just as any other Microsoft executable,
and opens up a blank command shell while the program is executing. Quitting the software
is done by closing the command prompt or hitting Ctrl-Alt-F8. During execution all
captured messages are written to a text file in Unicode format on the machine where the
recording software is running. An example output from the driver can be seen in both
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. The order of the output for each line includes the process name, a
brief description if one is available, the time the action occurred (in milliseconds since the
system was booted), the X and Y coordinates if the action is mouse related, and the type of
event the message was generated for.
The software collects messages as they are sent, so the operating system dictates the
resolution at which mouse movement events are recorded. In a typical recorded movement,
mouse move are registered about every 20 milliseconds. Key presses, releases, and mouse
button clicks are recorded when they are registered by the operating system in both the up
and down direction.
3.2

Collection Environment and Task Selection

1. The data collection was performed on a desktop configured with:
• Windows 7 Service Pack 1
• Microsoft Office Professional Plus 2010
• Internet Browsers
– Internet Explorer 9
– Firefox 15.0.1
– Google Chrome 23
The participants used a standard 104 key Windows keyboard, three button mouse with
a scroll wheel and had one monitor available with a resolution of 1024x768. Each of the
participants were required to perform three separate but similar internet based research
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tasks. The three tasks asked users to research the pros and cons of installing wind power,
solar power and solar water heating at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and
write a 400-500 word report on each, to include pictures and/or charts to their liking.
The exact document given to each participant can be seen in Appendix C. The topic of
the scavenger hunt was not essential to the experiment as the main goal was to have the
users interact with the machine by doing tasks like searching for text, switching between
applications, scrolling documents, choosing the type of applications to use, etc. This type
of task, while it is not completely free computer use, is more general than what Imsand
used in his GUI study where participants were asked to perform a structured task, but still
open enough to resemble a work related task.
In order to ensure that the driver continues to run throughout the testing period a batch
script is run. This batch script refreshes the directory where the output files are being
stored so that the proctor can ensure the files are continually growing while the participant
is working. In order to keep the command window visible a program is used called Always
On Top which when configured, forces the command window to remain on top of all other
windows. The command window is then resized so that it takes up a minimal portion of the
screen as seen in Figure 3.2.

3.3

Participant Selection
Thirty one participants came from the general population of AFIT. The majority of

the participants were graduate students but there were also instructors, professors and other
administrative personnel involved. Since the subjects were all some type of government
employee we were able to assume that they had basic computer skills with the Windows
operating system to include performing internet searches and the use of a Microsoft Office
application for composition. For this reason, no time was allotted for the user to get
comfortable with the system.
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Figure 3.2: The collection environment.

1. Demographics were also taken on the participant population to include:
• Age range
• Current profession
• Highest degree of academic achievement
• Gender
• Dominant hand
• Opinion of computer skills
• Average daily computer use
• Source of computer skills
• Typing rate
Each of these questions are asked in order to asses if certain individuals had any
contributing factors from their background that may make them more or less likely to
have a higher classification accuracy within the biometric system. By analyzing a users
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demographics, Imsand [9] was able to discover differences in his systems ability to profile
a user. The full survey given to each participant is displayed in Appendix D.
3.4

Feature Generation
After data collection, the raw data is processed to create features for classification. The

features calculated are selected from prior works because of their reoccurrence or due to
their promising results. As discussed in Section 2.3, previous work has split their collected
data up in a variety of ways in order to create a block over which a set of features are
calculated. In this system the data is chosen to be sliced on a task basis, meaning that a set
of features is generated over each of the three tasks a user completes as seen in Figure 3.3,
creating three feature vectors per user. This is chosen to ensure that enough data from each
modality is collected to allow the features to be consistent and also to not affect the count
based GUI features which were previously calculated over a task based feature generation
period by Imsand [9, 15–17].

User 1
Task 1
Task 2
Task 3

User 1
Feature Set 1
Feature Set 2
Feature Set 3

User 2
Task 1
Task 2
Task 3

User 2
Feature Set 1
Feature Set 2
Feature Set 3

…
User 31
Task 1
Task 2
Task 3

User 31
Feature Set 1
Feature Set 2
Feature Set 3

Figure 3.3: Features are generated for each user on a per task basis.
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3.4.1

Keystroke Features.

The keystroke features are based off of the work of Marsters [20]. Two different types
of features were calculated, durations and latencies, displayed in Table 3.3. Marsters [20]
determined that the most consistent keystroke features were seen when the user had pressed
a key, or key digraph at least three times in the feature generation period. For this reason
the same method is used here and features are not calculated for keys or key combinations
pressed less than three times.
3.4.1.1

Keystroke Duration.

Keystroke durations include the mean time that each key is held down which can also
be described as the average difference in time between the depress and release of each key.
The total time as well as the number of times the key has been pressed is stored for each of
the 104 keys. This allows the mean duration of all presses for each key to be calculated.
3.4.1.2

Keystroke Latencies.

Keystroke latencies record the average time it takes for someone to transition between
two keys. For example when typing “in” the time between when the user depresses “i” and
depresses “n”. Using the key down times of every two pairs of adjacently pressed keys an
array of latencies can be derived. These are also stored in a similar way as the durations
by keeping track of the total latency and number of times the key combination has been
witnessed. With a 104 key keyboard this results in 10,816 possible digraph combinations,
most of which will never occur. Due to this, any features that never get assigned a value
for any user are removed as they do not add value for the classification algorithm.
The user pausing while typing is something that naturally occurs, and it can affect the
accuracy of the keystroke latency times. In this type of experiment there are several reasons
as to why the user might stop typing, to include if the user begins using the mouse, they
get distracted by something around them, or they are just pausing to gather their thoughts.
Latencies that have any type of mouse movements in between them are trivial to find and
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are discarded since it is known that the user has switched away from typing. Hempstalk
[23], noticed that users often pause either after pressing the space bar or before pressing
the space bar in order to compose their thoughts. Since this has been consistently noticed it
is thought that these pauses could add identifiable information to a user’s latency times and
are therefore not removed on a threshold. If a user pauses due to a distraction in the room
or in their mind there is no way to determine this without monitoring them in some other
form than our software, such as with a camera, etc. Due to this, these types of pauses are
left in the data as they cannot be removed with out using a threshold on latency time.

Table 3.3: Keystroke features.
Feature Type

3.4.2

Description

Duration

Average duration each key is held down

Latency

Average latency in transition between two key presses

Mouse Features.

The mouse features were derived from Ahmed, et al. [14], Zheng, et al. [12], and
Shen, et al. [19]. The calculation of each feature type is discussed below and listed in
Table 3.4. A portion of the features are movement based and require a movement to be
defined in order for the feature to be calculated. It was determined that there are two things
that can start a movement for the mouse cursor; they are a left button release or a period
of silence that goes to movement. If the cursor registers no movement for one second or
longer it is deemed to be a period of silence. The value of one second was selected to be
a reasonable measure for a period of silence since no previous work defined what interval
they used. All events recorded by the driver are in chronological order so movements are
discovered by iterating until a movement starter is found. Next the nearest movement ender
is located. There are three items that classify as a movement ender. They are a button press,
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Fig. 2. Mouse dynamics detector architecture.

45 degrees.

3.4.2.2

Movement Direction Histogram.

The movement direction histogram contains the percentage of movements that the user
makes in each of the eight directions.
3.4.2.3

Travel Distance Histogram.

The travel distance histogram contains the percentage of the movements that a user
makes in certain distance ranges. All of the distance ranges are measured in pixels. The

33

histogram contains 3 values: short (0-300 pixels), medium (301-600 pixels) and long (601+
pixels). These ranges are from Shen, et al. [19] and due to the resolution of the screen in
their testing environment being 1024x768 as well.
3.4.2.4

Distribution of Actions on the Screen.

The distribution of actions made on the screen results in a histogram containing
the percentage of movements that end in nine different regions of the screen as seen in
Figure 3.5 [19].

1024

768

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Figure 3.5: The nine screen regions.

3.4.2.5

Single Click Interval Times.

The click interval times are calculated for left and right button single clicks. The single
click interval times were calculated by subtracting the time of the down click from the time
of the up click, establishing an interval. The average and standard deviation of the intervals
for left and right single clicks are calculated and turned into four features.
3.4.2.6

Left Double Click Interval Times.

Double click interval times were calculated by determining the time between all
consecutive button down and button ups in the four event sequence. This lead to three
different intervals, and the total time is also used creating four intervals which are turned
into eight features by calculating the average and standard deviation for each interval.
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3.4.2.7

Pause and Click Time.

The pause and click time is the amount of time it takes for the user to click the mouse
button after they have stopped moving the cursor. This was shown to be a discriminating
feature by Zheng, et al. [12]. The average and standard deviation is taken for both the right
and left button, generating four features.
3.4.2.8

Action Histogram.

The action histogram contains the percentage of actions of a given type made by the
user. It is made up of five different action types: the number of left, right and double clicks,
the number of mouse wheel events, and the number of click and drag actions in where the
user holds down the left button while moving the cursor.
3.4.2.9

Extreme Movement Speed Relative to Travel Distance.

The extreme movement speed made by a user in relation to travel distance is similar
to the travel distance histogram but instead looks for the largest recorded speed in a given
distance range. The same three range lengths are used from the travel distance histogram
but with the units of pixels per second.
3.4.2.10

Movement Elapsed Time Histogram.

The time it takes to complete each movement is calculated and stored. Using this
stored data, a histogram is created that has information about the number of movements
that fall into each time interval. Ahmed, et al. [14] split the histogram up using half second
intervals from 0-4 seconds so the same is done here.
3.4.2.11

Average Movement Speed Relative to Travel Distance.

The average movement speed for each travel distance [19] is calculated using
previously stored distance and speed calculations about each movement. The same travel
distances are used again from the travel distance histogram in order to determine the
average speed for short, medium and long movements.
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Table 3.4: Mouse modality features.
Feature Description
Average Speed per Movement Direction [14]

Calculation Details (# of Features)
Average velocity in pixels/sec (8)
% of movement in each

Movement Direction Histogram [14]
of the 8 directions (8)
% of movements occurring in
Travel Distance Histogram [14]
each of 3 distance ranges (3)
% of actions ending in each
Distribution of Actions on Screen [19]
of the 9 screen regions (9)
Avg and St Dev for L/R
L/R Single Click Interval Times [19]
button click duration (4)
Avg and St Dev for all consecutive
Left Double Click Interval Times [19]
presses and releases (8)
Avg and St Dev between when
Pause and Click Time [12]
cursor stops and click occurs (4)
% of time each of the
Action Histogram [14]
5 core actions occur (5)
Largest recorded velocity (pixels/sec)
Extreme Movement Speed [19]
for each of the 3 distance ranges (3)
Histogram of movements based on
Movement Elapsed Time Histogram [14]
elapsed movement time (9)

3.4.3

Average Movement Speed Relative

Avg movement velocity seen in

to Travel Distance [14]

each of three travel distances (3)

GUI Features.

The features for the GUI usage analysis are calculated by determining the number of
times each message occurs as summarized in Table 3.5. This method follows Imsand’s
process [9], and enumerates differences between the usage styles of different individuals.
A counting method is used to translate the text output from the driver into numerical values
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that the machine learning algorithms can utilize. In order to do this three different classes
of items are monitored: user actions, control types and executing processes.
3.4.3.1

User Actions.

This can be any type of user initiated action such as keystroke or mouse event. The
counts of each of these separate events are used as the feature values. Unlike for the
keystroke features, there is no limit on the number of times the user must make an action
for the feature to be counted, all are used.
3.4.3.2

Control Types.

This is represented by a count of each unique type of window class name, which gives
a general idea for the GUI buttons and controls that a person uses.
3.4.3.3

Processes Executed.

A count of the number of times each process is seen. This captures what processes or
applications the participant is using, as well as a rough estimate on the number of actions
that process was used for.

Table 3.5: GUI usage features.
Feature Type

Description
Count of each type of user action observed

User actions
(mouse button clicks, key presses, etc.)
The number of each type of GUI control message observed
Control Types
(button, scroll bar, ToolbarWindow32)
Processes Executed

The number of times each process name is observed

It is important to note that the entire sample space of the class names and processes is
not known before the feature generation occurs, and cannot easily be determined like the
entire space of key digraphs. In order to ensure all GUI features are generated, a known
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values method is used. Each time the feature generator is run it updates a file containing
the list of known processes and class names that have been seen. This list is then used to
print out the features to the feature file. One disadvantage to listing the GUI features using
this known values method is that when a new user’s data set is added, if it contains a new
known value, all of the feature sets for every user must be updated to reflect the presence
of any new features introduced by the new user’s data. This is necessary when the number
of users who have features calculated is small, however once the number of users grows
larger the amount of new known values found is expected to greatly to diminish.
Updating the existing feature sets is done with minimal processing by a program that
adds the appropriate number of question marks, annotating missing values, to the end of all
previous users feature sets. In the feature file, the GUI related features are printed out last,
with the newly found features at the end of the GUI section making them the last features
listed for each user. This setup allows for missing values to simply be added at the end
of each previous users instance until all contain the proper number of features. Adding
missing values works for each user since it is known that no previous users have values for
the newly found GUI attributes. It is possible that once a sizable number of window class
names have been discovered this process could be stopped and only generate features for
the known set class names, ignoring any new class names, however in this experiment it is
necessary to ensure that all window class names that get collected are used.
3.5

Fusion System Design
To determine if the fusion of features from all of the modalities (keyboard, mouse and

the GUI) provide better results than the individual modalities by themselves, comparison
testing of each of the modalities individually, along with two fusion approaches, is
performed for multi-class and binary class datasets.
The first fusion approach, seen in Figure 3.7, involves feature fusion, combining all
of the features into one file that then has feature selection and classification performed on
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it to produce results. In Figure 3.8 a decision level fusion technique is presented. Each
modality is classified individually, with the results of those classifications being fed into
an ensemble classifier that produces the final decision. Both of these experiments use all
31 participants who each provide three data samples for feature generation. All feature
selection and machine learning classification is done using the Weka data mining toolkit.
Three different classification algorithms are tested; BayesNet, LibSVM and the J48 (C4.5)
decision tree. BayesNet was used successfully in keystroke identification by Marsters [20],
LibSVM was successfully used by Shen, et al. [19] for classifying mouse dynamics and a
variant of the C4.5 decision tree was used by Pusara, et al. [7].
3.5.1

Datasets.

Before discussing the fusion techniques in detail, it is necessary to distinguish between
the two datasets that will be tested. Both a multi-class (identification) and binary-class
(authentication) dataset are tested for each individual modality and the two methods of
feature fusion.
3.5.1.1

Identification.

Identification is a multi-class classification problem. From the data, an ideal classifier
distinguishes and identifies the user that generated a given dataset, producing a response of
1-31. Identification classification testing is done with 3-fold cross-validation using two of
each users datasets for training and the third for testing.
3.5.1.2

Authentication.

Authentication is a binary classification problem. When using this method a classifier
is trained for each individual user. The classifier is given a set of features which represent
the known user, and also a sampling of feature sets that represent other users which are
not the known user. Remaining feature sets are then fed to the classifier and it is asked
to make a decision on whether that data belongs to the known user or not. This type of
experiment can lead to two different types of error. Type I error, in which a user who should
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be authenticated is not, and Type II error in which a user who should not be authenticated
is. These errors are represented as the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance
Rate (FAR) respectively. The following is broken up into information on how the training
set is created for the classifier and what type of data the classifier is tested with.
In order to create the training set a data imbalance needs to be overcome. The data
imbalance occurs from distinguishing one user as the known user, and the remaining 30
as unknown users. This leads to only 3 feature vectors for the known user and 90 for
the unknown user, which can be seen in Figure 3.6. Due to the small number of training
samples that are available per known user, using all of the data for the unknown users
creates an imbalance in the training data (2 training sets for the known user and 60 for the
unknown users). In order to cut this imbalance down a random sampling of four unknown
data sets are used, as seen in Figure 3.6. This reduces the number of unknown to known
instances to a 2:1 ratio and improves results.

Total Feature Vectors
Known

¬Known
90

3
1 user x 3 samples = 3

Training Set

Known
2
2 Known user
samples

30 users x 3 samples = 90

¬Known Known
4

1

4 Unknown user
samples

1 Known user
sample

Testing Set

¬Known

30
30 unknown user
samples

Figure 3.6: The composition of the training and testing dataset for authentication.

The testing data is selected from datasets that have not been used for training.
Figure 3.6 shows that the final unused dataset from the known user is added to the test
set along with one data set from each of the remaining 30 users, all of which are labeled
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as unknown users. Using a test set from each user as opposed to just users who have been
trained on, allows for many more tests, but more importantly provides a more realistic
scenario where the classifier may be encountering testing data for an unknown user that it
has not been trained on.
Each of these testing and training cycles are performed three times per user to ensure
that all possible combinations of testing and training data are achieved with the three known
user samples. Due to the fact that the four unknown training instances, and the 30 unknown
testing instances are selected randomly, it is necessary to replicate the dataset multiple times
in order to achieve statistical normality. Each of the three known user combinations are
replicated 30 times, leading to 90 total training/testing dataset pairs per user. The average
of the FAR and FRR is taken over each of the three known user combinations for all 30
replications. This is done for all 31 users. The final FAR and FRR are then calculated by

(330 features)

taking the average over all 31 users.
(80 features)
Feature
Selection
Keystrokes
10,920 features
Mouse strokes
65 features
GUI Msgs.
291 features

(11 features)
Classifiers

PCA/
MDL
Disc./
Wrap
eval

BayesN
LibSVM
J48

Decision

Figure 3.7: Feature level fusion.

3.5.2

Feature Level Fusion.

To test the feature fusion method represented by Figure 3.7, all features are combined
before any processing occurs. The full dataset is placed into one flat file and feature

Keystrokes
10,920 features
Mouse strokes
65 features

Feature
Selection

Classifier 1

MDL

BayesN
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PCA

LibSVM

Classifier 2
BayesN
LibSVM

Decision

selection is performed on the data as a whole. Comparison testing of different classifiers is
performed using the BayesNet, LibSVM and J48 machine learning algorithms. It should be
noted that the type of feature selection used is performed on a per classifier basis. BayesNet
requires discretized data so each dataset classified with BayesNet is passed through a
supervised discretizing filter based on Fayyad and Irani’s Minimum Description Length
(MDL) method [21]. LibSVM requires the data to be run through a Principle Components
Analysis (PCA) prior to being classified. Finally, since J48 can handle a wide variety of
data, the best feature selection method is found through preliminary testing to be a wrapper
evaluator using the best first search method. After performing feature selection the final
feature count for each classifier is reduced to the number seen in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: The number of features used by each classifier after feature selection.
Classifier

Feature Selection

Final # of Features

BayesNet

MDL

330

LibSVM

PCA

80

Wrapper Evaluator

11

J48

3.5.3

Ensemble Based Decision Level Fusion.

In ensemble learning multiple classifiers make decisions on smaller pieces of a
larger dataset. These predictions are then combined into a single predictive model which
generally will have better performance than any of the individual classifiers alone [32]. In
Figure 3.8 the features from each modality are passed through their individual classifier
before they are fused together. The type of classifier used for each modality is based on the
results from the identification section in Table 4.2. In order to take the output from each of
the individual modality classifiers and turn it into usable data for the ensemble classifier, a

42

processing module uses the initial classifiers decisions to generate a set of features which
are used by the ensemble classifier.

Feature
Selection

Classifier 1

MDL

BayesN

Mouse strokes
65 features

PCA

LibSVM

GUI Msgs.
291 features

MDL

BayesN

Keystrokes
10,920 features

Classifier 2
BayesN
LibSVM
J48

Decision

Figure 3.8: Ensemble based decision level fusion.

Three sets of testing and training data are generated for each of the 31 users, and once
again they are generated 30 times as discussed in Section 3.5.1.2. This is done for all three
modalities individually. Each of the testing and training set pairs, are then run through
their respective feature selection methods and classifier. A results file is produced for each
training and testing pair with one line of data in the results file per each instance tested from
the corresponding test file. Every result contains the class predicted by the classifier for
that instance, the classifiers confidence in it’s decision represented as a probability, and the
actual class of the test instance. An example output is displayed in Table 3.7. The feature
file for the final classifier contains three features, consisting of the confidence probability
from each of the three individual modality classifiers, and also a class value representing
the actual class of the instance. The percentages are expressed with respect to the known
user (a probability of 1.0). This means that if the predicted class was an unknown user (a
target probability of 0.0), 1 minus the confidence percentage is used, and if the predicted
class is the known users, the actual value is used. This is necessary to do in order for the
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classifier to be able to determine the difference between the data representing the two class
values.

Table 3.7: Example output from a individual modality classifier.
Predicted Class

Probability

Actual Class

1
0
1

0.8053219426444527
0.9860154197012099
0.6758392920350555

1
0
0

It should be noted that it is possible to have a mix of decisions from the initial
classifiers as seen in Table 3.8. For example, one modality could predict the data is from
the known user, while the other two predict it is from the unknown meaning the initial
classifiers have made contradicting decisions. Ideally this allows the final classifier to
decide which modality should be alloted more significance in the final predictive model.

Table 3.8: Feature generation example for the ensemble classifier.
Modality

Predicted Class

Probability

Actual Class

Feature Value

Key

1

0.9526

1

0.9526

Mouse

1

0.8057

1

0.8057

GUI

0

0.9398

1

0.0602

Since there are 30 unknown user decisions made for every one known user decision,
the number of unknown user decisions that are used for creating the ensemble classifiers
feature file are reduced. This is done in order to create the best balance of training data
between the two class values for the ensemble classifier. With the large number of decisions
that occur over all combinations and replications, 10-fold cross-validation is used to assess
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the performance of the ensemble classifier. The same three classifiers, BayesNet, LibSVM,
and J48, are tested as the ensemble classifier seen in Figure 3.8.
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IV.

T

Results

his chapter analyzes the classification accuracy of both fusion techniques and
determines if either is significantly more effective than the individual modalities on

their own. There is also an analysis of the individual modalities performance, comparison
of the fusion techniques to previous work, an analysis of how demographics may affect the
accuracy of the system, and a alternative way to divide the user generated data.
The 31 test subjects worked on three tasks for an average of 114 minutes. The
data collected included 10,446 keystrokes per user with 673 digraphs logged, and 77
of the 104 keys being pressed. An average of 335 mouse movements per session, 23
different processes used, and 147 window class names being registered. Based on this,
over nine thousand keyboard features were eliminated due to the fact that no feature values
were generated by any of the users. This occurred because of certain keys or two key
combinations never being hit by any user throughout the experiment, resulting in the
features adding no classification value.
Due to the fact that features were calculated over each task there are only three feature
vectors available per user for classification. This small number of feature vectors for each
user can cause data imbalance problems between the two class values, as described in
Section 3.5.1.2. This small number of feature vectors also required us to use 3-fold crossvalidation for identification testing, as opposed to a more standard 10-fold cross-validation
approach. Collecting a small amount of user data is not uncommon in this area of research
however, mainly due to the use of human subjects. Imsand, et al. [9, 15–17] used the same
technique, calculating feature vectors across tasks resulting in the same imbalance, having
just three feature vectors per user. Pusara, et al. [7], also used a similar method dividing
up their collected data into quarters, using two quarters for training, the third for parameter
selection, and the final quarter for testing. Finally, the setup of the authentication dataset
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is inline with previous work [14, 19, 22] in terms of having to randomly select a subset
of the unknown user instances to create a balance between the two class values, known
and unknown. While this method does not provide a large amount of data to be used for
classification, it has been successfully implemented in previous work without adversely
affecting the results. To ensure that system performance did not occur due to chance,
statistical testing is also performed throughout this chapter. This is done to confirm that
the results are significant, allowing us to be more confident that the small number of user
samples did not cause atypical performance of the system.
In Section 4.5 each users data was divided up on a 10 minute time interval for feature
generation in order to try and create more samples so that 10-fold cross-validation could
be used for testing. However, this method drastically decreased the number of user actions
that each feature sample was generated over, hurting overall performance of the system.
Each of the classifiers and feature selection methods were tuned to provide the highest
accuracy, with the final parameters shown in Table 4.1. BayesNet was left in its default
configuration as provided by Weka. Different estimators and search algorithms were tested
but none outperformed the SimpleEstimator or the K2 search algorithm. LibSVM allows
for different kernel functions as well as the manipulation of several parameters for each.
The sigmoid kernel consistently generated the best results. An experiment was run inside
of Weka on the γ parameter and it was deteremined that setting it to 0.01 yielded the highest
classification accuracy. The J48 decision tree was tried with several feature selection
methods to include ReliefF and a discretization filter; however the wrapper evaluator
produced the best results. Parameters were also adjusted to include, using and not using
pruning, and adjusting the confidence factor, however none improved results over the Weka
defaults.
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Table 4.1: Final parameters used for the selected algorithms.
Machine Learning Algorithm

Final Parameters Selected

BayesNet

MDL discretization [21] with Weka defaults
Principle component analysis

LibSVM
J48

4.1

Sigmoid kernel, γ = 0.01
Wrapper evaluator with Weka defaults

Feature Fusion Results
4.1.1

Identification (Multi-class Dataset).

From the identification results displayed in Table 4.2 it can be seen that the fusion
of features, using the method shown in Figure 3.7, performed better than any of the
individual modalities on their own. An identification percentage of 97.85% was achieved
using BayesNet which outperforms the keystroke, mouse and Graphical User Interface
(GUI) modalities when classified on their own. The high fusion percentages validate our
hypothesis that by combining features from multiple modalities, classification accuracy can
be improved. As can be seen, the keystroke features consistently performed better than the
other two modalities which is discussed in Section 4.1.3.

Table 4.2: Identification (multi-class) classification comparison results.
Identification (3-fold CV) (%)
Keyboard

Mouse

GUI

Fusion

BayesNet

94.62 ± 3.72

20.43 ± 3.73

70.96 ± 3.23

97.85 ± 1.86

LibSVM

76.34 ± 1.86

69.89 ± 1.86

45.16 ± 14.78

74.19 ± 11.63

J48

66.67 ± 8.12

30.11 ± 6.72

40.86 ± 1.86

73.11 ± 4.93
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Timing data regarding the classifiers is also important to note. As the BayesNet
performed much better in accuracy it also produced the quickest total classification time
when including the feature selection steps. A table representation of the data can be seen
in Appendix F. On average, including discretization, 3-fold cross-validation on the feature
fusion identification dataset was performed in 0.93 seconds with MDL discretization [21]
taking 1.2 seconds. LibSVM took 6.87 seconds for classification and 32.1 seconds for
principle component analysis, and J48 took only 0.56 seconds for classification but over 19
minutes for feature selection using the wrapper evaluator.
4.1.2

Authentication (Binary Class Dataset).

Identifying a user is nice, but being able to authenticate that user is the primary
goal behind this system.

The results achieved when performing the authentication

experiment show similar trends with the multi-class dataset, as seen in Table 4.3. BayesNet
outperforms both LibSVM and J48 with a full fusion False Acceptance Rate (FAR) of
3.15% and False Rejection Rate (FRR) of 1.82% when implementing feature fusion.
Correcting the imbalance of data when performing the binary class experiment was
necessary in order to improve classification performance of the system. As mentioned,
the number of unknown user instances included in the training data was four. Figure 4.1
shows that using four instances, or a 2:1 ratio, generates the best results when taking both
FAR and FRR into account.
In order to ensure that the fusion results are significantly better than any of the
modalities on their own, significance testing is performed over the results of the trials.
Significance testing is performed using the Welch two sample t-test. A requirement of the
t-test is that the data be normally distributed. In order to determine if the data collected is
in fact normal, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test is used. A p-value of 0.78 was achieved,
implying that the null hypothesis is rejected (the data is not normally distributed), and
accepting the alternative hypothesis that the data is normally distributed. The Welch t-
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Figure 4.1: Relationship with the number of unknown user instances in the training set and
FAR/FRR for feature fusion.

test was selected because it is designed to determine whether a difference in two datasets
occurred simply due to chance or not. A standard significance level of 0.05 was selected
for the test. The significance results for the fusion technique can be seen in Table 4.4 for
FAR and Table 4.5 for FRR.

Table 4.3: Authentication (binary-class) classification comparison results.
Authentication FAR & FRR (%)
Keyboard

Mouse

GUI

Fusion

FAR

3.51 ± 0.46

16.22 ± 1.30

18.03 ± 1.12

3.15 ± 0.55

FRR

4.62 ± 1.83

26.70 ± 3.47

20.29 ± 3.13

1.82 ± 1.13

FAR

15.52 ± 1.10

0.53 ± 0.28

8.78 ± 1.07

17.13 ± 1.35

FRR

22.94 ± 3.29

88.24 ± 3.22

45.63 ± 3.84

15.70 ± 3.19

FAR

25.02 ± 1.61

32.03 ± 1.90

27.77 ± 1.73

26.15 ± 1.84

FRR

23.91 ± 3.48

29.93 ± 4.04

34.23 ± 3.99

26.77 ± 3.85

BayesNet

LibSVM

J48

50

By looking at each of the p-values in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 we can see that they
are much smaller than the significance level that was set. This means there is convincing
evidence that each of the outcomes recorded in Table 4.3 did not occur due to chance. The
feature fusion results in Table 4.3 are bolded to represent that they are significantly better
than any other results in the table. In Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 all results are recorded with
respect to the individual modality data. This means that a confidence interval range of
{0.09%, 0.61%} for fusion versus the keystroke modality, means there is 95% confidence
that the FAR of the keystrokes will be 0.09% to 0.61% higher than the fusion FAR. Looking
at all of the data in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 it can be seen that the fusion technique is
statistically significantly in terms of its effectiveness for authentication when compared
to any individual modality by itself. The FAR value for mouse data produces the only
negative confidence interval, however this can be discounted because of it’s extremely high
FRR values.

Table 4.4: Significance of fusion FAR vs individual modalities FAR.
Comparison

p-Value

95% Confidence Interval

0.008

{0.09%, 0.61%}

Fusion vs. Mouse

< 0.001

{-2.40%, -2.85%}

Fusion vs. GUI

< 0.001

{14.42%, 15.33%}

Fusion vs. Key

Table 4.5: Significance of fusion FRR vs individual modalities FRR.
Comparison

p-Value

95% Confidence Interval

Fusion vs. Key

< 0.001

{2.01%, 3.58%}

Fusion vs. Mouse

< 0.001

{85.15%, 87.67%}

Fusion vs. GUI

< 0.001

{17.23%, 19.68%}

51

4.1.3

Individual Modality Performance.

Keystroke features performed the best across all of the classification algorithms mainly
because of the large number captured during data collection. Marsters [20] determined that
a training block could be calculated effectively with as few as 300 keystrokes. On average
our participants generated 3,482 keystrokes per task, exceeding the number needed and
improving the classification accuracy of this modality, as it out performed both the mouse
and GUI consistently.
The highest identification rate seen for the mouse dataset was 69.89% using LibSVM.
This poor performance in comparison with prior work, is attributed to the lack of
movements during subject testing. Previous mouse dynamics work [14, 19], required 2,000
mouse actions per training block to achieve their EER of around 1-3 percent. When our
users performed the tasks, they generated anywhere from 50-250 movements per task with
an average of 335 movements in an entire session. This does not meet the requirements laid
out by Ahmed, et al. [14] and Shen, et al. [19] in order to achieve their level of performance
and thus resulted in the mouse features under performing.
The point to point mouse features derived by Zheng, et al. [12] were also included in
order to gauge their effectiveness. According to Zheng they needed far less testing data than
the features derived by Ahmed, et al. [14] and Shen, et al. [19]. Zheng’s work achieved an
EER of 1.30% using only 25 mouse movements in the test set. After implementing these
features, the feature fusion identification results using BayesNet dropped by 4.31%, and
Zheng’s mouse features on their own were only able to achieve an identification rate of
4.30% using LibSVM. For this reason these features were dropped from the dataset. It is
believed that the methods and datasets used for trainging and testing along with the large
amount of training data required by Zheng, et al. [12] was the reason for poor performance.
Even though the test set only needed 25 mouse movements, their training set still contained
12,500 mouse movements which we were not able to achieve from our data collection. It
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is also believed that their point to point angle based calculations could vary greatly based
on the activity the user is performing at that given time.
The GUI features performed well given the unstructured nature of the task. Imsand
achieved an identification rate of 38% with a neural network. Using a BayesNet in this
experiment a 71% identification rate was achieved. It is thought that the broader task we
selected for the participants accentuated the preferences and tendencies that a user has
inside of the GUI. It is also feasible that allowing a user to perform free computer use
could further improve these results, however this would need to be tested.
4.1.4

Modality Data Imbalance.

Requiring each of the participants to type 400-500 words is likely what resulted in the
imbalance between the number of keystrokes and mouse strokes, as seen in Table 4.6. The
participants were encouraged to try and finish each task in 30 minutes in the interest of their
own time, but it is possible that this caused them to not fully perform the amount of mouse
interaction necessary. The similarity of the tasks also seemed to result in less actions being
taken in task three than task one. On average 126 mouse movements were recorded in task
one, 118 in task two and just 91 in task three. It is believed that this occurred because of
how the participants started to reuse general information pertaining to climate in the area,
and general information for introduction and concluding paragraphs.

Table 4.6: Achieved and desired number of actions per training block.
Modality

Desired Actions

Actions Achieved

Keystrokes

300

3,482

2,000

111

Not specified

147 window class names

Mouse movements
GUI messages

23 processes
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A second hypothesis is that once participants found an informative website pertaining
to green energy technologies, they were able reuse that website for all three tasks. This
would cause them to spend less time researching, resulting in fewer mouse movements. It
should also be noted that number of keystrokes recorded declined across the three tasks
as well. An average of 3,780 were taken in task one, 3,523 in task two and 3,143 in
task three, likely for the same reasons as were just stated. For the GUI messages, there
was no threshold set by Imsand because of his structured task based testing however our
31 participants generated messages on 147 unique window class names from 23 different
processes, which are displayed in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.
4.2

Ensemble Based Decision Level Fusion Classification Results
Ensemble Based, Decision Level (EBDL) fusion provides another method for fusing

the modalities (Figure 3.8). By combining the modalities together once they have been
individually feature selected and classified, it allows for increased accuracy compared to
what each of modalities provide on their own, and over feature fusion. The classifiers
used for the individual modalities were identified by the performance listed in Table 4.2.
BayesNet was selected for both the keystrokes and GUI messages while LibSVM was
chosen for the mouse strokes.
The classifier that performed the best as the ensemble classifier was the J48 with
bagging (Table 4.7). Bagging, also known as Bootstrap aggregating, generates multiple
versions of a classifier, J48 in this case, and uses a plurality voting scheme to make its
decision [24]. As with previous authentication tests above, due to the data imbalance
per class value, only one unknown test result was randomly selected, along with the one
good result to be placed in the ensemble classifiers feature file. As you can see from
Figure 4.2, the one-to-one ratio of unknown to known users data performed the best while
also outperforming feature fusion with a FAR of 2.65% and a FRR of 1.64%.
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Figure 4.2: Relationship with the number of unknown user instances and FAR/FRR for
EBDL fusion.

Significance testing is performed comparing the EBDL fusion method to feature
fusion. Once again the Welch t-test was used with the results for EBDL, using the J48
with bagging, and feature fusion using BayesNet since these produced the best accuracy
for each technique respectively. This test was performed with a significance level set to
0.05. From Table 4.8 it can be seen that the ensemble based method provides convincing
evidence that it is more effective than feature fusion when comparing FAR’s, with a p-value
of 0.005 and a 95% confidence interval of {0.10%, 0.51%}. When comparing the FRR of
the two fusion methods, no significant difference can be seen based on a p-value of .80 and
confidence interval that includes zero.
This is statistically significant evidence that EBDL fusion improves accuracy over
feature fusion and each of the individual modalities. These values are bolded in Table 4.7
to show that this method is significantly better than all others when considering FAR and
FRR. By allowing each of the modalities to be both feature selected and classified in an
environment that could produce the best results for that modality, it helped to improve the
FAR of classification. For example, when using feature fusion the mouse features were run
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Table 4.7: EBDL fusion authentication classification per machine learning algorithm
Ensemble Classifier

Feature Fusion (%)

EBDL Fusion (%)

FAR

3.15 ± 0.55

2.65 ± 0.10

FRR

1.82 ± 1.13

1.83 ± 0.10

FAR

17.13 ± 1.35

3.42 ± 0.02

FRR

15.70 ± 3.19

3.41 ± 0.03

FAR

26.15 ± 1.84

2.65 ± 0.12

FRR

26.77 ± 3.85

1.64 ± 0.11

BayesNet

LibSVM

J48 with Bagging

through discretization and the BayesNet where they were shown to perform very poorly
in Table 4.2. Due to this, it is likely that they did not add any discriminatory value to the
feature fusion tests. However, running them through PCA and LibSVM vastly improves
their classification accuracy which helped improve the results of EBDL fusion over feature
fusion.

Table 4.8: Significance of feature fusion vs. EBDL fusion.
Comparison

4.3

p-Value

95% C.I.

False Acceptance Rate (FAR)

0.005

{0.10%, 0.51%}

False Rejection Rate (FRR)

0.80

{-0.35%, 0.46%}

Comparison with Prior Individual Modality Results
It needs to be noted that the best results presented from previous work on the

individual modalities are able to report a better FAR and FRR than appear here. However,
to achieve these results months of collection and hundred of hours worth of user interaction
needed to be collected for training. In this experiment an average of 76 minutes of
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interaction was used for classifier training to include about 7,000 keystrokes and 220 mouse
actions during that time. In contrast Marsters, et al. [20] collected 18 months of keystroke
data to train their system to an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.27%, Ahmed, et al. [14]
collected over 12 hours of mouse interaction per user to achieve an EER of 2.46% and
Shen, et al. [19] recorded data from users for two months resulting in a FAR of 1.86%
and FRR of 3.46%. For a system fielded in a real world environment it is not practical
to wait this amount of time for the system to become fully trained. By using a fusion of
data from multiple modalities a machine learning algorithm requires far less training time
to accomplish similar classification results.
The amount of data required for testing is perhaps more important. An experienced
malicious user needs only a matter of minutes on a internal computer to impact a network.
In a system that is designed to detect and deter an insider threat there needs to be a
compromise between the number of actions a user must take to create a testing block,
and the accuracy of the system. Some of the previous work require less testing data than
our fusion system but this is offset by a very large amount of training data needed as can
be seen in Table 4.9. Another benefit to the fusion system is that it is able to capture a
malicious user’s actions regardless of whether they are using the keyboard or mouse to
accomplish their goal. By requiring only 36 minutes of user interaction to achieve an FAR
of 2.65% and FRR of 1.64%, fusion from multiple modalities helps to decrease the amount
of time required to achieve an acceptable testing set regardless of which modality the user
is interacting with.
Due to the classification improvement for these previous systems over time though,
it is thought that if more data could have been collected for each user, the classification
accuracy would be improved. Table 4.9 shows the number of actions required for both
the testing and training set used by previous work along with their best performance
classification accuracy. The work done by Imsand, et al. [9, 15–17] does not specify a

57

Table 4.9: Required number of testing and training actions per previous work.
Previous Work

Training Actions

Testing Actions

Results

Marsters [20]

>85,000 KS

>300 KS, 3 Hrs

EER 0.27%

Ahmed, et al. [14]

10,000 MM

2,000 MM

EER 2.46%

Zheng, et al. [12]

12,500 MM

25 MM

EER 1.30%

N/A

N/A

FAR 8.66%

Imsand, et al. [9]
FRR 0.0%
7,000 KS, 220 MM,

3,500 KS, 110 MM,

FAR 2.65%

72 minutes

36 minutes

FRR 1.64%

EBDL Fusion

precise number of actions because of their task based testing, so it is not specified. In
Table 4.9 KS stands for keystrokes, and MM for mouse movements.
4.4

Demographic Effects on Results
Demographics were taken on each participant in order to assess if there is any

correlation between performance of the system and the computer skills of a person, their
age, education level, dominant hand, etc. Ideally this information was collected, and the
tests performed, to determine if a certain type of user will be predisposed to better or worse
results from fusing multi-modal data together. All the collected information per participant
can be seen in Appendix E. It was theorized that computer skill and computer use could
result as discriminating factors since users who spend more time with a computer may be
more likely to act consistently across all three tasks for each of the modalities, keystrokes,
mouse dynamics and GUI usage patterns.
1. Tests were performed across the following groups:
• Opinion of computer skills
• Daily computer use
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• Dominant hand
• Source of computer skills
• Typing speed (< 50, 51-65, 65+) Words per Minute
• Education level
• Age
Comparison testing between each of the possible answers to a demographic question
was performed using the results from fusion testing. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
test was selected to determine if there are differences between any of the demographic
groups and their corresponding identification percentages. A significance level of 0.05 was
set for the tests.

Table 4.10: Significance of demographics on classification accuracy.
Demographic Comparison

p-value

Affects Classification

Opinion of computer skills

0.22

No

Daily computer use

0.93

No

Dominant hand

0.44

No

Source of computer skills

0.89

No

Typing speed

0.97

No

Education level

0.68

No

Age

0.67

No

Based on the significance level that was set, none of the demographics that were
recorded provided statistically significant evidence implying they affect the performance
of the system which can be seen in Table 4.10. The opinion of computer skills proved to be
the most likely to result in a difference, but the p-value was still outside of our significance
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level. This is a positive result in that based on the demographics collected we can say that
the fusion technique does not have a bias to producing better results given the background
of the individual. The system worked equally well for all types of users in this experiment.
4.5

Alternate Data Division Results
Generating features using shorter sample time, was done to assess the performance

of the system when it has less data for calculating features. In order to produce more
feature samples per user, features were generated over a 10 minute time window as shown
in Figure 4.3. Each users raw data output from the collection tool was split into 10 minute
blocks for feature calculation. Features were generated over each of these 10 minute blocks.
This results in an average of nine feature samples per user as opposed to the three on
the previous tests. Each of the tests from above are run again on this 10 minute split
dataset. This includes the identification and authentication tests for feature fusion and each
individual modality, and EBDL fusion. By dividing the data up in to 10 minute intervalsthe
samples had an average of 735 keystrokes, 28 mouse movements, and 147 window class
names over 23 unique processes applied.
4.5.1

Identification (Multi-Class Dataset).

Identification testing used 10-fold cross-validation to measure performance of three
different classifiers, BayesNet, LibSVM, and J48, were tested with feature fusion.
Table 4.11 shows that feature fusion improves classification accuracy over each of the
individual modalities while using features calculated over 10 minutes of data. It should
also be noted that the overall classification accuracy of the system dropped when using
less data for calculating the feature sets. The features proved to be less reliable when
calculating over this smaller time window than as was shown in previous identification
testing (Section 4.1.1), which used features generated over each of the three tasks.
However, generating more feature samples allowed for 10-fold cross-validation to be used.
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Figure 4.3: Data division and feature generation process for the 10 minute data split.

This creates further confidence that feature fusion will consistently improve identification
classification over using an individual modality on its own.

Table 4.11: Identification (multi-class) classification comparison results.
Identification (10-fold CV) (%)
Keyboard

Mouse

GUI

Fusion

BayesNet

91.31 ± 4.01

11.12 ± 4.00

44.81 ± 6.20

95.19 ± 3.37

LibSVM

72.19 ± 6.83

42.85 ± 8.52

38.92 ± 8.59

78.67 ± 6.65

J48

69.65 ± 7.85

25.67 ± 6.73

39.84 ± 6.77

73.32 ± 7.25

4.5.2

Authentication (Binary-Class Dataset).

The authentication dataset was also tested to asses the performance of the fusion
system while using 10 minutes of user interaction to generate feature samples. The training
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and testing sets were as described above, but the number of feature samples in each training
and testing set had to be slightly modified in order to adjust for the larger number of
feature samples that were available per user. In order to match the experiment discussed in
Section 3.5.1.2 (authentication using the task based feature sets), the training and testing
sets were created in the following way.
4.5.2.1

Training and Testing Set Creation.

The known users feature samples were divided up into three separate groups with
roughly the same number of feature samples in each group. This was done to simulate the
three feature samples in the task based feature generation experiment (Section 3.5.1.2). By
doing this, two thirds of the known users feature samples could be used for the training set,
followed by one third for the testing set. For the following explanation the variable x is
defined as follows:
x=

 #o f KnownU serFeatureS amples 
3

To train the classifier on the unknown user, x feature samples were randomly selected from
four unknown users. The testing set then consists of the final third of the known users
feature samples, which is of size x, and also one feature sample from all 30 unknown users.
Finally, this is replicated over all three possible combinations created by the three groups
of known users feature samples, allowing each of the three to be used in the testing set. The
three combinations are then replicated 30 times in order to achieve statistical normality due
to the random sampling.
By testing this authentication dataset the results displayed in Table 4.12 were
achieved. The classification accuracy of all classifiers dropped, similar to the results of the
identification dataset, due to the small number of user actions achieved over each feature
sample. The results achieved using feature fusion along with the BayesNet for classification
are bolded once again to represent that they produced statistically significant improvement
over each of the individual modalities.
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Table 4.12: Authentication (binary-class) classification comparison results.
Authentication FAR & FRR (%)
Keyboard

Mouse

GUI

Fusion

FAR

13.60 ± 0.71

24.83 ± 1.14

26.08 ± 1.09

12.10 ± 1.13

FRR

7.51 ± 1.38

31.48 ± 2.90

28.41 ± 2.59

5.36 ± 0.93

FAR

9.73 ± 0.78

16.27 ± 1.14

13.61 ± 1.15

12.80 ± 0.77

FRR

31.18 ± 2.02

43.18 ± 2.52

50.12 ± 2.89

18.81 ± 2.20

FAR

20.39 ± 1.24

27.76 ± 1.53

21.94 ± 1.48

21.79 ± 1.49

FRR

18.00 ± 2.25

36.60 ± 3.15

31.89 ± 3.55

17.54 ± 2.43

BayesNet

LibSVM

J48

To perform statistical testing, the data was once again proven to be approximately
normal using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test. The Welch t-test was then used in order to
asses if the difference between two datasets occurred due to chance or not. The feature
fusion dataset was compared to the results achieved for both FAR and FRR. The results
from the t-tests can be seen in Table 4.13 for FAR and Table 4.14 for FRR. Feature fusion
generates statistically significant improvement over each of the individual modalities in
terms of both FAR and FRR.

Table 4.13: Significance of fusion FAR vs individual modalities FAR.
Comparison

p-Value

95% Confidence Interval

Fusion vs. Key

< 0.001

{1.00%, 1.99%}

Fusion vs. Mouse

< 0.001

{3.57%, 4.75%}

Fusion vs. GUI

< 0.001

{14.12%, 15.27%}
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Table 4.14: Significance of fusion FRR vs individual modalities FRR.

4.5.3

Comparison

p-Value

95% Confidence Interval

Fusion vs. Key

< 0.001

{1.53%, 2.76%}

Fusion vs. Mouse

< 0.001

{36.82%, 38.81%}

Fusion vs. GUI

< 0.001

{22.03%, 24.07%}

Ensemble Based, Decision Level Fusion.

EBDL fusion was also tested using the feature samples calculated over 10 minutes of
user interaction in order to asses if it would outperform feature fusion as was seen above in
Section 4.2. The individual modality classifiers were selected from the best results seen in
Section 4.5.1. BayesNet was used for Keystrokes and GUI features and LibSVM was used
for mouse movements. The ensemble classifier was tested using BayesNet, LibSVM, and
J48.
From the results displayed in Table 4.15 it can be seen that the J48 with Bagging still
produced the highest classification accuracy. Finally Table 4.16 shows that EBDL fusion
produces significant improvement over feature fusion in terms of the FAR, however feature
fusion produced significant improvement over EBDL fusion in terms of the FRR. Due
to this conflicting information, we cannot say for certain that either of the fusion methods
performed better than the other using the features calculated over the 10 minute interval. As
mentioned above though we can say that both of the fusion methods produced statistically
significant improvement over the individual modalities on their own.

4.6

Summary
Collecting user interactions from the keyboard, mouse and GUI, prevents a malicious

user from escaping the watchful eye of a system that is able to monitor all three at once.
On top of this, GUI usage analysis seeks to emphasize how the user interacts with the
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Table 4.15: EBDL fusion authentication classification per machine learning algorithm
Ensemble Classifier

Feature Fusion (%)

EBDL Fusion (%)

FAR

12.10 ± 1.13

7.28 ± 0.78

FRR

5.36 ± 0.93

7.78 ± 0.88

FAR

12.80 ± 0.77

9.68 ± 0.84

FRR

18.81 ± 2.20

7.25 ± 0.76

FAR

21.79 ± 1.49

7.64 ± 0.80

FRR

17.54 ± 2.43

7.50 ± 0.83

BayesNet

LibSVM

J48 with Bagging

Table 4.16: Significance of feature fusion vs. EBDL fusion.
Comparison

p-Value

95% C.I.

False Acceptance Rate (FAR)

< 0.001

{3.96%, 4.95%}

False Rejection Rate (FRR)

> 0.999

{-1.69%, -2.59%}

system, such as do they prefer keyboard shortcuts over GUI menus, page up/down versus
the scroll bar or scroll wheel, etc. There are thousands of minute differences between
how two different users interact with a computer system. Analyzing the entire picture of a
users interaction is shown to improve the accuracy and reliability of a behavioral biometric
system over using a singular modality. EBDL fusion significantly outperformed each
individual modality as well as feature fusion for the task based feature samples, producing a
FAR of 2.65% and FRR of 1.64%. These results are in line with previous singular modality
work but require less training and testing time to be achieved. By attempting to drop the
training and testing time even further, features were generated over a 10 minute interval.
This lead to respectable results with the system achieving an EER of 4.81% using BayesNet
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for Identification, however the classification accuracy of the system was degraded because
of the smaller amount of user data that was available for feature generation per sample.
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V.

A

Conclusions

uthentication is traditionally based on something you know and/or something you
have such as a Common Access Card (CAC) and pin number or a username

and password, but biometric authentication relies on something that you are. Physical
biometrics such as fingerprint scanning and facial recognition have dominated behavioral
biometrics which include keystroke dynamics, mouse dynamics, signature recognition,
etc. in terms of real world implementation. However, the use of the keystrokes, mouse
dynamics and Graphical User Interface (GUI) interaction can be captured from existing
hardware throughout a user’s session without interrupting them in order to provide active
authentication.
5.1

Final Thoughts
There has previously been research into using keystrokes, mouse dynamics, and GUI

usage as separate biometric techniques but until now these three modalities have not been
combined into a single system. Thirty one participants performed three free computer
use research tasks resulting in an average interaction of 114 minutes including 10,446
keystrokes and 335 mouse movements. Using a Windows driver that captures messages
sent internal to the Windows 7 operating system, the participants were monitored in three
areas, their keystrokes, mouse actions, and GUI usage. Features were then generated on
the data gathered for each of the three modalities. Fusing multi-modal data together was
performed using feature fusion, where all modalities were feature selected and classified
as a whole, and also using Ensemble Based, Decision Level (EBDL) fusion, where each
modality was feature selected and classified on its own, with the results being used by
a final classifier to make a decision. Both fusion methods were tested, along with the
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individual modalities on their own in order to determine whether fusion could increase the
performance of a biometric system.
The results show that EBDL fusion produced statistically significant improvement
over the singular modalities and feature fusion with a False Acceptance Rate (FAR) of
2.65% and a False Rejection Rate (FRR) of 1.64%. While this research has not been able
to out perform some of the results produced by the best individual modalities, the amount of
training and testing time needed to reach these results is far less than previously seen. This
is important to note due to the speed an insider threat would be able to disrupt a network
after gaining control of an unlocked computer. The systems ability to collect data from
all contact surfaces also makes it more robust than previous work that attempts to combat
an insider threat. Regardless of how the malicious user is interacting with the machine, a
system that fuses data from multiple modalities will be able to capture it.
The system and experiment discussed present a new approach to combining multiple
forms of behavioral biometrics into one architecture. This system fuses data from a users
keystrokes, mouse movements and GUI usage together for classification. The fusion of
data from multiple modalities requires less time, and user actions, during both training and
testing in order to achieve comparable results to previous work.
5.2

Future Work
The end goal of this type of biometric authentication system is to be deployed in a real

world environment where users are going about their daily tasks. In order for this to happen
several issues need to be addressed in future work. The first is the effectiveness of this
system when using free use data. Keystroke and mouse features have both been tested in
previous works in a free use environment however it remains to be seen if the GUI features
will scale to this type of data. Results are promising though given their improvement from
Imsand’s [9, 15–17] structured task testing to this experiment. Testing in this free use
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environment also allows for more data collection per user, this means the system could be
tested on more than three feature vectors that were available in this experiment.
Second, is the way the data is divided up into training and testing sets in order to
perform active, on-line authentication. Previous work has done this in a variety of ways,
none of which has provided a way forward as to which method presents the most effective
solution. When considering data coming in from different modalities the data slicing
becomes even more difficult. Most published work has calculated features over a block
of data based on the number of actions contained in that block. However, a method for
doing this across multiple modalities needs to be researched. There are often long periods
of time when a user is interacting with only the mouse and not the keyboard or vice versa.
This presents a conflict for generating features across all modalities at the same time. When
creating this division there is also a balance that must be made between the amount of time
it takes to collect one training or testing set and the accuracy of the system. As as shown in
Section 4.5 when slicing data over a 10 minute interval the number of actions available for
generating features was reduced, which degraded the quality of the feature samples.
The accuracy and amount of training time required for these systems must continue
to improve if there is ever a hope for real world deployment. Overwhelming a network
administrator or users on a network with false rejections can ruin the usefulness of the
system and productivity of the organization. Even a system with a FRR of 0.01% will
incorrectly authenticate one user per hour on a network that has 100 users authenticating
10 times per hour. On the contrary though an extremely accurate system that requires on
the order of hours of data to authenticate a user is not of use. Skilled malicious users could
get their work done and be in another area code before anyone is alerted of what they have
done if the testing set requires too much data. As is seen throughout this thesis and previous
work there is often a trade off between the number of actions collected and the accuracy of
the system.
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Appendix A: List of Windows 7 Window Class Names

BluetoothNotificationAreaTaskSwitcherWnd

DDEMLMom

IconWindowClass

Static

ERCAPPIPCRECEIVER

CalcFrame

ATL:000007FEF52DD770

MSTaskListWClass

CiceroUIWndFrame

COMTASKSWINDOWCLASS

Breadcrumb Parent

Progman

MSCTFIME UI

DesktopLogoffPane

DirectUIHWND

msctls progress32

ANIMATION TIMER HWND

AUTHUI.DLL

Desktop top match

Desktop OpenBox Host

#32770

TaskListThumbnailWnd

MSTaskSwWClass

SearchEditBoxWrapperClass

TravelBand

#43

NotifyIconOverflowWindow

DDEMLEvent

Desktop NSCHost

CicMarshalWndClass

TrayClockWClass

FaxMonWinClass

DV2ControlHost

DesktopDestinationList

GDI+ Hook Window Class

CabinetWClass
Groove.Class.BroadcastServices

msseces class

Button

.BroadcastReceiver

OleMainThreadWndClass

tooltips class32

ReBarWindow32

ShellTabWindowClass

ToolbarWindow32

Desktop More Programs Pane

DesktopSpecialFolders

ExplorerBrowserNavigation

Shell TrayWnd

MS WebcheckMonitor

Search Box

CicLoaderWndClass

SHELLDLL DefView

Desktop User Picture

SystemTray Main

PNIHiddenWnd

ConsoleWindowClass

ATL:000007FEFB8141F0

LivePreview Address Band Root

Desktop Search Open View

Edit

SysTreeView32

PropertyControlBase

SysListView32

Desktop User Pane

OleDdeWndClass

Media Center SSO

RunDLL

WorkerW

TrayNotifyWnd
WindowsUpdate-

Dwm

DesktopProgramsMFU

NotificationWindow

Ghost

ATL:000007FEF6C6D770

ATL:000007FEFB6E41F0
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ATL:000007FEF3D452C0

TrayShowDesktopButtonWClass

UniversalSearchBand

NamespaceTreeControl

ATL:000007FEFBC641F0

CtrlNotifySink
PrintCacheLocalConnection-

ATL:000007FEFC4441F0

PrintCacheListenerWindow

ListenerHiddenWindow

PrintTray Notify WndClass

NManager

LogMeInGui

TASKENGINEWINDOWCLASS

ATL:000007FEFCD841F0

MMDEVAPI

SysShadow

ATL:000007FEFC2F41F0

ScrollBar

ATL:000007FEF2D452C0

#32768

ATL:000007FEFCF441F0

ATL:000007FEFB2441F0

DUIViewWndClassName

SysLink

ATL:000007FEFC4D41F0

ATL:000007FEF5E29D80

Flip3D

SysDragImage

CLIPBRDWNDCLASS

ATL:000007FEF38152C0

ATL:msctls progress32

ATL:000007FEFBFD41F0

ATL:000007FEF6269D80

ATL:000007FEF2DF52C0

SearchEditBoxFakeWindow

ATL:000007FEF6274750

IME

Auto-Suggest Dropdown

ComboLBox

ATL:000007FEF5E34750

FloatNotifySink

Notepad

ComboBox

Photos CommandBar

Photos NavigationBar

ATL:000007FEF01AA040

ATL:000007FEF01A9E40

ATL:000007FEF01A9400

Photos ButtonEx

Photos NavigationPane

Photos PhotoCanvas

Photo Lightweight Viewer

AltTab KeyHookWnd

ATL:000000013F846DC0

NativeHWNDHost

VANUITooltip

SysTabControl32

ATL:000007FEF5E99D80

ATL:000007FEF61552C0

ATL:000007FEF5EA4750

SyncMgrTrayIconClass

DisplaySwitchUIWnd

ATL:000007FEFB5641F0

ATL:000000013F186DC0

ATL:000007FEF7319D80

ATL:000007FEFB9D41F0

ATL:000007FEF4DA9D80

ATL:000007FEF4DB4750

ATL:000007FEF25E52C0

ATL:000007FEFBEA41F0

ATL:000007FEF56A9D80
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Appendix B: List of Windows 7 Processes

Explorer.exe

calc.exe

WINWORD.EXE

iexplore.exe

ActiveAuthentication.exe

EXCEL.EXE
install reader11 en gtba chra

cmd.exe

POWERPNT.EXE

dy aih.exe

Eula.exe

setup.exe

chrome.exe

AcroRd32.exe

rundll32.exe

WerFault.exe

ExcelPasswordDemo.exe

Dwm.exe

firefox.exe

notepad.exe

DllHost.exe

sethc.exe

DisplaySwitch.exe

conhost.exe
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Appendix C: Tasks Given to Testing Participants

Task 1
Being “green” can involve several different facets. This could include using an energy
source that is sustainable into the future as well as friendly to the environment such as solar,
wind or tidal energy. Being “green” can also involve making changes to current architecture
of a building or generating new ways to operate in order to consume less energy.
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is looking for the best way to become a
“green” institution. They need your help determining the return on investment for installing
a Wind Turbine behind the facility.
1. The deliverable for this task is a 400-500 word report detailing your findings and
recommendation on the best course of action for turning Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT)into a “green” campus.
• You should use the internet to find factual information to include in your report.
Documentation of your sources does not need to occur but please do not copy
and paste information directly from a web page.
• Factors to take into consideration when making your recommendation
– Estimated cost of the solution
– Environmental factors that make a wind turbine efficient
– Estimated energy savings and/or power generated
– Life expectancy of the system
The costs and benefits may be best expressed in a table. Also, please include any
other information you deem to be necessary. After completing the report, copy it to the
given removable hard drive.
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Task 2
Being “green” can involve several different facets. This could include using an energy
source that is sustainable into the future as well as friendly to the environment such as solar,
wind or tidal energy. Being “green” can also involve making changes to current architecture
of a building or generating new ways to operate in order to consume less energy.
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is looking for the best way to become a
“green” institution. They need your help determining the return on investment for installing
50 square meters of solar energy photovoltaic cells on the top of building 642.
1. The deliverable for this task is a 400-500 word report detailing your findings and
recommendation on the best course of action for turning AFITinto a “green” campus.
• You should use the internet to find factual information to include in your report.
Documentation of your sources does not need to occur but please do not copy
and paste information directly from a web page.
• Factors to take into consideration when making your recommendation
– Estimated cost of the solution
– Environmental factors that make solar cells efficient
– Estimated energy savings and/or power generated
– Life expectancy of the system
The costs and benefits may be best expressed in a table. Also, please include any
other information you deem to be necessary. After completing the report, copy it to the
given removable hard drive.
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Task 3
Being “green” can involve several different facets. This could include using an energy
source that is sustainable into the future as well as friendly to the environment such as solar,
wind or tidal energy. Being “green” can also involve making changes to current architecture
of a building or generating new ways to operate in order to consume less energy.
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is looking for the best way to become a
“green” institution. They need your help determining the return on investment for installing
for installing 50 square meters of solar water heating on building 640.
1. The deliverable for this task is a 400-500 word report detailing your findings and
recommendation on the best course of action for turning AFITinto a “green” campus.
• You should use the internet to find factual information to include in your report.
Documentation of your sources does not need to occur but please do not copy
and paste information directly from a web page.
• Factors to take into consideration when making your recommendation
– Estimated cost of the solution
– Environmental factors that make solar water heating efficient
– Estimated energy savings and/or power generated
– Life expectancy of the system
The costs and benefits may be best expressed in a table. Also, please include any
other information you deem to be necessary. After completing the report, copy it to the
given removable hard drive.
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Appendix D: Demographic Survey Given to All Participants

Demographic Survey
Date:
Current Profession:
Highest Degree of Academic Achievement:
Gender:
Age:

M
18-24

F

Abstain

25-39

Dominant Hand:

40-65

Left

65+

Right

How Strong are your computer skills? (Circle one)
Below Average

Average

Above Average

Very Strong

Average daily computer usage in hours: (Circle one)
0-2

2-4

4-6

6-8

8+

What is the source of your computer skills? (Circle all that apply)
Self taught

Course/Instruction

Computer related degree

What is your average typing speed? Please take the typing test and record your speed
here:
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Appendix E: Demographic Information for All Participants

1. Legend:
• ST: Self taught
• CI: Course/instruction
• CD: Computer related degree (Computer science, computer engineering, etc.)

Profession
ID

Ed.

Gender

Age

Level

Dominate

Opinion of

Daily

Source of

Typing

Hand

Computer

Computer

Computer

Rate

Skills

Use (Hrs)

Skills

1

Student

M.S.

M

25-39

R

Average

6-8

ST

50

2

Student

M.S.

F

25-39

R

Above avg

6-8

ST,CI

55

3

Student

B.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

6-8

ST,CI

58

4

IT

B.S.

M

25-39

L

Very good

4-6

CD

40

5

Student

B.S.

M

18-24

R

Average

6-8

ST,CI

67

6

Instructor

M.S.

M

40-65

R

Above avg

6-8

CD

N/A

7

Instructor

M.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

2-4

CD

N/A

8

Instructor

M.S.

F

40-65

R

Average

4-6

ST,CI

N/A

9

Instructor

B.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

8+

CD

N/A

10

Instructor

M.S.

M

25-39

R

Below Avg

4-6

ST

N/A

11

Instructor

M.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

6-8

ST,CI

N/A

12

Student

B.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

6-8

CD

59

13

Student

B.S.

M

18-24

R

Above avg

2-4

ST,CI

53

14

Engineer

B.S.

F

18-24

R

Average

8+

CI

51

15

Engineer

B.S.

M

25-29

R

Average

2-4

CI

49

16

Student

M.S.

F

25-39

R

Above avg

6-8

ST

68

17

Student

B.S.

M

25-39

L

Very good

6-8

ST

60

18

Professor

PhD

M

25-39

R

Above avg

6-8

ST,CI

90

19

Student

M.S.

M

25-39

L

Above avg

4-6

CI

51

77

20

Student

B.S.

M

25-39

L

Above avg

4-6

ST,CI

43

21

Student

M.S.

F

25-39

R

Above avg

6-8

ST,CI

54

22

Professor

PhD

M

40-65

R

Very good

2-4

ST,CI

50

23

Student

B.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

8+

CD

37

24

Staff

PhD

F

25-39

R

Very good

6-8

CI

33

25

Student

B.S.

F

18-24

R

Average

ST

6-8

58

26

Student

M.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

8+

ST

79

27

Student

B.S.

M

25-39

R

Very good

8+

CD

74

28

Student

B.S.

M

25-39

R

Above avg

6-8

ST,CI

58

29

Student

M.S.

M

25-39

R

Average

4-6

ST,CI

46

30

Student

M.S.

M

25-39

L

Average

2-4

ST

28

31

Student

B.S.

M

18-24

R

Above avg

2-4

ST

44
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Appendix F: Multi-class Classification Timing Information Using the Fusion Dataset

Algorithm

Feature Selection Time (sec)

Classification Time (sec)

Total (sec)

BayesNet

1.2

0.93

2.13

LibSVM

32.1

6.87

38.97

J48

1143

0.56

1143.56
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Appendix G: Institutional Review Board Approval
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